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The year 2020 has so far stood completely under the influence of Corona. The virus
was first detected in China in late 2019, and spread all over the globe over the coming
months. Nearly everyone was, and is, affected. People were afraid of getting infected
and limited all sort of social interaction. Many countries implemented shutdowns
with the goal of reducing the spread of the virus and saving lives. While the virus
has spread, the world have experienced the severe recession in a long time. Beyond
economics, Corona is present in every aspect of our daily life. On the one hand, there
has been a tremendous number of touching examples of care for people at risk, and
support for the parts of the population who are most affected by the consequences
of the epidemic. On the other hand, some people deny the severity of the virus,
question the need for social distancing and protest against public health measures.
This work aims to summarise the economic literature as of June 2020 on the
trade-off between saving lives and livelihoods. The authors wrote it during a Bache-
lor Seminar, while the whole world learned simultaneously about COVID-19. In the
following, we document the consequences of past epidemics on these two dimensions.
In Chapter 3, we present a simple epidemiological model that documents the expo-
nential spread of epidemics. In Chapter 4, we discuss the trade-off between lives and
livelihoods in much more detail, providing cost-benefit analyses for several measures
aimed at reducing social interactions. Chapter 5 looks at potential fiscal policy
measures that may “flatten the recession curve”, to use an analogy of Gourinchas
(2020). Chapter 6 combines the epidemiological model with standard theoretical
macroeconomic models to describe economic developments under different sets of
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macroeconomic models to describe economic developments under different sets of
policies, while Chapter 7 summarises the existing empirical forecasts.
1
Chapter 2
Historical Economic Effects of
Pandemics
Radu Parfene
Determining the economic effects of pandemics from a historical point of view has
always been a very demanding and challenging task for research. The further back
in time, the more difficult it is to reconstruct what economic effects a particular
pandemic has had on society. This is obviously due to the difficulty in finding reli-
able data that can really explain pandemics, their impact from a social point of view
(e.g. number of deaths, number of people infected), and ultimately their economic
consequences. Despite these challenges, some general effects can be clearly deter-
mined. This is important, because those historical economic effects of pandemics are
a useful indicator to better predict the effects of future pandemics and take action
in advance.
Such effects usually develop through exogenous circumstances or shocks as well
as endogenous behavioural changes that affect both labour supply and aggregate
demand; they create economic uncertainty and inequality. In general, all pandemics
cause a decrease in labour supply and aggregate demand, which leads to a strong
contraction of the economy. Increasing uncertainty about future income and em-
ployment opportunities lowers the amount of investments as firms become more
reluctant and pessimistic with respect to future economic scenarios. A further effect
of pandemics throughout history is regarding inequality: most pandemic episodes
are related to an increase in inequality, even though in current literature the effect
on inequality is still subject to debate. More specifically, the Black Death is the
only event related to a decrease in inequality, while subsequent pandemics are as-
sociated with an increase in inequality due to changes in institutional norms that
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allowed wealthy families to preserve their properties from one generation to the other
(Alfani, 2015).
Table 2.1 – Main Pandemic Events in Chronological Order
Event Time Geographic region Estimated
death toll
Death toll as share
of world population
(in %)
Black Death 1347 - 1352 Europe, Asia and Africa 25 Million 6
Flu Pandemic 1918 - 1920 Worldwide 17 - 50 Million 1 - 3.1
Post-World War II Pandemics 1968 - ongoing Worldwide 1.2 to 1.6 Million 0.024 - 0.032
COVID-19 2019 - ongoing Worldwide 810,000 0.01
Notes: The post-World War II pandemics include the Hong Kong flu, SARS, H1N1, MERS, Ebola
and Zika; Sources: Own production based on data from Benedictow (2004), Correia et al. (2020)
and Jamison et al. (2017). The numbers for COVID-19 are retrieved from the Johns Hopkins
University COVID-19 Dashboard (as of 24 August 2020)a.
a For further information, refer to https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html.
This Chapter initially illustrates the case of the Black Plague in Section 2.1, a
pandemic that struck humanity in the 14th century with tremendous consequences
for the economic systems of the time. In Section 2.2, we shed light on the effects of
the Black Death and subsequent pandemics on the distribution of wealth and income
as well as on the labour markets. Then, in Section 2.3 we perform an analysis of
the economic impact of the flu Pandemic in the 20th century. Section 2.4 focuses
on selected post-World War II pandemics and their impact on the growth of Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) and on unemployment. The existence of better and more
recent data for these pandemics also allows to analyse the fiscal policy response
to them. Section 2.5 concludes with insights related to the COVID-19 pandemic.
More specifically, four channels and their corresponding economic consequences are
illustrated: number of deaths, economic uncertainty, social distancing, and fiscal
policy. Afterwards, the general-equilibrium model is explained.
2.1 The Black Death
The Black Plague was the worst plague in documented human history. It struck
Europe in the time period from 1347 to 1352 and killed between one third and two
thirds of the European population (Del Panta, 1980; Benedictow, 2004). It also
reached Northern African countries as well as large areas of Asia.
The economic damage caused by the Black Plague has been substantial and
observable from the outset. According to Jedwab et al. (2019), crops in rural areas
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remained uncultivated and trade in cities was abruptly interrupted. Following a
collapse of the local economy, citizens faced severe food shortages and rising inflation.
As stated by Campbell (2016), the simultaneous economic impact of the plague on
labour supply and demand for goods and services led to an instant and lasting
contraction of the economic system. Both nominal and real wages grew after the
shock (Munro, 2003). In the long run, salaries increased, but this growth was only
gradual, peaking in much of Europe in the middle of the 15th century. Then, salaries
fell again as a result of population growth after 1500 (Jedwab et al., 2019).
Other scholars, instead, highlight that the Black Death and further epidemics
allowed Western Europe to pursue a faster economic growth, because in the Malthu-
sian economies, a so-called “high-mortality” demographic regime corresponds to
higher income. Conversely, advanced nations in Asia, like China, which were af-
fected by the plague to a lesser extent, were locked in a “low-mortality” and “low-
income” equilibrium (Clark, 2007). According to this perspective, which may sound
rather counterintuitive, the plague actually had — in terms of income — a positive
effect on the quality and purpose of European citizens’ lives by increasing their pur-
chasing power even if a reduction in their life expectancy at birth occurred. This
current of thought relies on the fact that there is evidence of a long-run increase in
real wages among Mediterranean countries in the time period immediately after the
Black Death (Pamuk, 2007).
Yet, it is clear that the Black Plague has not had such positive repercussions
everywhere. It appears that, in sparsely populated areas across Europe, the Black
Death did not lead to an improvement of economic conditions, but rather to a long-
run contraction of the economic system as a whole.In Spain, for instance, where it
stopped a path of sustained economic growth started in 1270, “the Plague destroyed
the equilibrium between scarce population and abundant resources. Pre-Black Death
per capita income levels were temporarily recovered by the late sixteenth century,
but were only exceeded after 1820” (Alvarez-Nogal and De La Escosura, 2013, p. 3).
Other countries with low population density, such as Ireland, appear to have followed
the same pattern of economic decline (Kelly, 2004). In Eastern European countries,
the epidemic might have accelerated the so-called “second serfdom” phenomenon,
causing a decrease in the social welfare of peasants on both the demand and supply
side in the long run (Domar, 1970; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012), although not
all scholars share this perspective (Dyer, 1995). Another striking example of the
economic damage caused by the Black Death is Egypt. Here, the epidemic depop-
ulated many rural areas. This led to the collapse of the irrigation system, which is
considered as one reason for the sustained contraction of agrarian output in Egypt
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in the centuries following the Black Death (Borsch, 2005, 2014). The data available
in the period before the onset of the Black Death are few, but they are consistent in
indicating an evident and lasting breakdown caused by the epidemic, as implied in
Figure 2.1, which shows both the total agrarian and the per-capita output (Alfani
and Murphy, 2017).
Figure 2.1 – Agrarian Output in Egypt
Source: Alfani and Murphy (2017)
2.2 Short and Medium Run: Wealth and Income
Distribution and the Labour Market
It is debatable whether major pandemics had positive or negative effects in the long
run, but it is certain that, in the short run, pandemics did considerable damage to
the economies of countries and society in general, not to mention the psychological
damage to citizens. The communities affected by the plague suffered heavy costs
from the interruption of trade and economic activity, the destruction of human and
physical capital — the latter occurred from clearing cities of the objects that could
have facilitated the spread of the illness — and the exhaustion of resources used
during the crisis to mitigate the epidemic (Alfani, 2013). Two particular aspects of
pandemics in the short to medium run have attracted the attention of researchers:
wealth distribution and the labour market.
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Alfani and Murphy (2017) investigated three Italian regions, namely Piedmont,
Tuscany and Emilia-Romagna together with the south of France, where trends of de-
cline in inequality were found, proving once again that a fall in economic inequality
can be associated with the Black Death. Interestingly enough — and as described
later in this Chapter — the decline in inequality cannot be shown for later pan-
demics. In Figure 2.2, an example from the city of Prato in Tuscany is provided,
highlighting how the Black Death actually spread wealth more evenly across the
population.
Figure 2.2 – Wealth Distribution Before and After the Black Death in Prato
(Italy)
Source: Alfani and Murphy (2017)
More precisely, Lorenz curves are shown in the Figure 2.2, plotting actual distri-
bution compared to the hypothetical equal distribution represented by the 45-degree
line. If a Lorenz curve gets closer to the 45-degree line, inequality falls (Alfani and
Murphy, 2017). These findings concerning the decrease in inequality caused by the
Black Death raised two compelling questions:
1. What is the mechanism underlying the decline in inequality?
2. Why did the pandemics that occurred after the Black Plague, particularly
those of the 17th century, not cause such a decline in inequality?
A possible answer to the first question could be the fact that the Plague lead to a
redistribution of income as a result of an increase in real wages (Cipolla, 1964). More
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specifically, as labour supply diminished following the Black Death, real wages and
the labour-share of output increased, while the capital-share of output dropped. This
led to more wage adjustment. Research provides important evidence illustrating that
this was actually the case in the period immediately after the Black Death (Pamuk,
2007). Furthermore, both wealth inequality and capital income inequality may tend
to decrease as a larger part of the population has a higher purchasing power due to
increased wages and more possibilities to afford a new property because of higher
supply and less expensive real estate characterising the market after the plague.
Regarding the second question concerning the increase in inequality in pandemic
episodes of the 17th century, a possible answer can be given considering the institu-
tional adaptability of the time. Although inheritance systems were put in place both
before and after the Black Plague, subsequent pandemics of the 17th century led to a
strong spread of institutions to preserve and defend larger assets from possible risks
of dispersion. Fideicommissum, which guaranteed that a certain number of proper-
ties was transferred unchanged from one generation to the next, is presumably the
most widespread and well-known (Cohn, 1997).
As with income redistribution, it is highly unlikely that all epidemics have in-
fluenced the labour market in the same way. The result was probably based on the
structure and level of mortality in society, the spread of the epidemic over the terri-
tory, and the historical context. In many cases, the main objective was to uphold law
and order by ensuring that the poorer classes did not gain bargaining power over the
elites. The policies implemented became decrees contra laboratores, namely against
the labourers, to stop the increasingly pressing demands of the lower classes. These
pro-elite policies led to a decline in real wages in the short term (Cohn, 2007). Even
in a liberal city like Florence, policies against the poorer classes were implemented.
To sum up, the labour market was more influenced by decisions taken by politics,
which decided with targeted policies who would benefit from certain resources and
who would not (Cohn, 2007).
2.3 The 1918 Flu Pandemic
This pandemic is also known as the Spanish flu. It started in January 1918 and
lasted until December 1920, spreading all over the world. Estimates indicate that
about 500 million people were infected with the virus and that there were up to 50
million deaths worldwide (Correia et al., 2020).
There is little data on the short-term economic effects of the influenza pandemic.
According to Garrett (2008), newspapers of the time illustrate that the pandemic
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caused damage to businesses in many sectors of the economy. The geographical
areas most affected by influenza experienced a relative increase in wages in line
with labour shortages (Garrett, 2009). The increase in influenza-related mortality
in 1918 caused real GDP to fall between six and eight percent (Barro et al., 2020).
There are also several studies analysing the long-term economic consequences of
influenza. According to Brainerd and Siegler (2003), states with high influenza
mortality in 1918 experienced a stronger growth in income per capita in the long
run after the pandemic (1919 to 1929). These results are in line with growth patterns
where a decline in labour increases the capital-labour ratio and subsequent growth.
Conversely, using more disaggregated variation for the Brazilian city of São Paulo,
Guimbeau et al. (2020) record a negative impact of the 1918 influenza pandemic on
health, which thus endogenously caused a decline in productivity in the long run.
2.3.1 Economic Effects in the Short to Medium Run
In the analysis of the economic consequences of the 1918 flu on local economic ac-
tivities, a specific question should be answered: what were the channels whereby
whereby the outbreak influenced local economic activity? (Correia et al., 2020).
Eichenbaum et al. (2020a) theorise that pandemics impact both the supply side and
the demand side of an economy, and the flu pandemic likely caused these effects
as well. Precisely understanding the mechanisms underlying these complicated eco-
nomic processes is quite difficult. However, some empirical evidence may be helpful
in identifying the relevant channels.
Regarding the supply side, a stronger spread of the flu decreased labour supply
due to self- isolation measures following a higher risk of being infected with the virus,
limitations on mobility, illness and higher mortality. Additionally, the pandemic
brought about a general disruption of ordinary economic activity (Correia et al.,
2020). For instance, efforts to reduce gatherings of people lowered the number of
employees working equipment in manufacturing plants and even lead to the closure
of some business departments.
The spread of the flu also reduced aggregate demand in several ways. As a way to
deal with the increasing risk of getting infected with the virus, households reduced
their consumption whenever there was no substitute good which could be consumed
with less interpersonal contact. Present and future income decreases from supply-
side shocks also had a negative effect on demand. In addition, growing uncertainty
about future income and employment opportunities lowered demand, particularly
for durable goods. This led to a self-reinforcing feedback, as lower expectations
and higher uncertainty of firms about expected future demand lead to a fall in
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investments (Correia et al., 2020).
An extremely important factor during a pandemic is the function of banks. They
play a key role in determining the scale of the decline in demand and production
capacity. Since a pandemic is in itself a temporary event, one should expect an in-
crease in demand for liquidity (Holmström and Tirole, 1998). A sound and healthy
banking system can provide an adequate level of liquidity, lessening the severity
of the decline in demand and production. However, if the disruption causes many
defaults, it could burden the banking system, which in turn would reduce its abil-
ity to provide lending. Thus, banks’ losses could have exacerbated this dangerous
mechanism by decreasing credit supply (Correia et al., 2020).
2.3.2 Anecdotal Evidence on the Economic Impact of the
Flu Pandemic
The economic damage caused by the 1918 pandemic can also be seen in the news-
papers of the time. The pandemic hit the economic system through the channels
of supply-side in terms of declining productivity and labour scarcity (Correia et al.,
2020). Furthermore, declines in production were observed in different fields of the
economy, among them coal and copper mining, shipbuilding, textile production,
retail and wholesale trade, and entertainment (Correia et al., 2020).
2.3.3 Inequality
Most scholars agree on the fact that the Black Death reduced inequality, while
pandemics of the 17th century did actually increase it. The actual effects of the
1918 flu pandemic on inequality unfortunately remain unclear in current literature.
In the analysis of this pandemic, arguments can be made in both directions. On
the one hand, inequality could have decreased as fewer labourers were available to
work following the strong decline in the labour force caused by the pandemic, which
forced landowners to pay them more in order to get their return on the land. On the
other hand, it could have increased as richer people likely had more opportunities
to protect themselves and avoid social interactions during the 1918 flu pandemic.
The lack of studies in this regard does not allow to clearly understand which of the
two channels actually dominated.
2.4 Post-World War II Pandemics
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Ma et al. (2020) perform a thorough analysis of the economic effects of six global
post-World War II pandemics reported on by Jamison et al. (2017). Namely, these
are the Hong Kong flu of 1968, SARS in 2003, H1N1 in 2009, MERS in 2012,
Ebola in 2014, and Zika in 2016. In this Section, some of their key findings are
presented. Firstly, the impact of the pandemics on GDP growth and unemployment
are considered. Secondly, the fiscal policy response enacted in reaction to them is
portrayed.
2.4.1 Impact on Global GDP
The left panel of Figure 2.3 shows the mean effect of the selected post-World War
II pandemics on GDP growth in affected countries relative to unaffected ones. A
severe deceleration of GDP growth in the starting year of the pandemic (year zero
on the timeline) is clearly discernible. It can also be seen how GDP growth in
affected countries overshoots that of unaffected countries in the first two years after
the start of the pandemic. However, in the years following this, GDP growth in
affected countries tends to decrease until it again trails that of unaffected countries.
This development, in combination with the fact the overshoot in years one and two
are not strong enough to compensate for the slower growth in the remaining years,
causes a dampening effect which is permanent.
The right panel of Figure 2.3 shows the mean effect of the selected post-World
War II pandemics on the unemployment rate of affected countries relative to un-
affected countries. Complementarily to the development of GDP growth, the un-
employment rate of affected countries is higher than that of unaffected countries
in the starting year of the pandemic. The unemployment rate, however, does not
tend to reverse its trend in the first year after the outbreak of the pandemic as
pronounced as GDP growth, implying that it is more persistent. Nevertheless, the
unemployment rate of affected countries decreases toward that of unaffected ones in
the following years until it is even slightly below it.
In general, it can be said that being affected by a pandemic hinders the economic
development of a country noticeably.
2.4.2 Fiscal Policy Response
Figure 2.4 displays the mean effect of selected post-World War II pandemics on
the government budget. The measures displayed can be utilised to deduce some
implications on how fiscal policy responds to a pandemic shock. Ma et al. (2020)
describe their findings as follows:
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Figure 2.3 – Mean Effect of Selected Post-World War II Pandemics on GDP
Growth and Unemployment Rate in Affected Countries Relative to Unaffected
Ones
Source: Ma et al. (2020)
”Following the shock, government revenue falls and spending increases,
resulting in a negative fiscal surplus and increase in debt. However, the
negative fiscal surplus converges to an insignificantly positive level two
years after the shock, while the debt slowly adjusts to zero.“ (Ma et al.,
2020, p. 29)
In general, the largest source of government revenue are taxes. Tax revenue
is positively related to economic activity, so the observed decline of government
revenue in the first years of the pandemic is consistent with the impact on GDP
growth and unemployment rate — two measures of economic activity — that is
presented in the previous Subsection. The rise in government spending as well as
the corresponding negative fiscal surplus and the debt level increase imply that the
governments of countries affected by a pandemic respond to the economic shock
caused by it with a visible fiscal expansion. The fact that both government revenue
and the fiscal surplus increase while government debt decreases in the aftermath of
the fiscal expansion demonstrates its effectiveness.
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Figure 2.4 – Mean Effect of Selected Post-World War II Pandemics on
Government Budget
Source: Ma et al. (2020)
2.4.3 An Example of a 21st Century Pandemic: SARS
The Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak was a pandemic that
took place in 2003, affected 37 countries on four continents, and caused around
8,000 cases as well as over 700 deaths (Jamison et al., 2017). The epidemic had sig-
nificant economic consequences for many Asian economies such as China, Singapore,
Vietnam and Hong Kong (Fan, 2003).
In the short term, SARS limited economic growth by reducing demand:
1. Consumer confidence suddenly collapsed in a number of countries, causing a
significant drop in private consumption spending. Much of this shock was due
to uncertainty about future economic prospects and fear created by SARS.
The population decided to stay at home to reduce the possibility of contagion.
2. Service exports, especially tourism-related export activities, have particularly
suffered from the emergence of SARS.
3. Investments were negatively affected by a general reduction in demand, in-
creased uncertainty, and increased perceived risks. In addition, foreign invest-
ment suffered delays and declined as a result of the pandemic.
4. Although increases in public spending by governments mitigated the impact of
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SARS, the ability of governments to regenerate the economy remained limited
due to the large reductions in private consumption.
While SARS had a negative impact on each component of aggregate demand,
private consumption was affected the most by this shock. Contact-intensive services
experienced a significant decline due to fear of contagion. Tourism, transport (par-
ticularly air transport), and trade were severely affected by this consumer reluctance
to frequent shops, restaurants and entertainment venues. In fact, many of them had
to cancel their airline reservations. Therefore, tourism has particularly suffered from
this severe crisis as it represents more than nine percent of GDP in East Asia and
eleven percent of GDP in South East Asia (Fan, 2003).
2.5 Insights for the Case of COVID-19
Translating estimates of historical effects into forecasts of the economic and financial
impacts that the COVID-19 pandemic will have is very difficult. Nevertheless, it
can be argued that COVID-19 affects the economy through at least four channels.
The first channel is represented by the number of people who die. Although there
is much in common between episodes of infectious diseases in the 21st century and
COVID-19, it is very likely that COVID-19 will cause far more deaths (Ma et al.,
2020). In this sense, COVID-19 could be worse in terms of lives than diseases such
as SARS and Ebola but not worse than the Black Death. The continuously growing
number of deaths and the higher risk of infection may lead to serious long-run
economic consequences. As labour supply is reduced, capital cannot be efficiently
operated, leading to lower returns on capital. As time goes by, capital adjusts to the
new equilibrium imposed by the smaller population and it decreases. This implies
that real interest rates are low until capital has adjusted to the new equilibrium and
investment remains low during the adjustment process (Jordá et al., 2020). Real
wages, instead, will be higher because of a partial increase in the number of workers
as a share of the total population above the usual equilibrium share. Moreover,
during the acute phase of the pandemic, people consume less in order to reduce the
likelihood of getting infected, and firms close. The recession should therefore lead
to a decline in savings, as consumption tends to be smoother than output. People
realise that they face a higher probability of dying and this aspect leads to a decrease
in discount factors, reducing the value of future consumption and thereby decreasing
savings.
Naturally, the COVID-19 pandemic has also generated an enormous increase in
economic uncertainty, which constitutes the second channel. According to Baker
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et al. (2020), this uncertainty shock is larger than the one associated with the global
financial crisis of 2008 and more similar in magnitude to the increase in uncertainty
at the time of the Great Depression. Baker et al. (2020) focus on the case of the
United States and claim that we are able to track and analyse the strong rise in
uncertainty in near real time through stock market volatility measures, newspaper-
based indicators of economic uncertainty, and by aggregating over answers to survey
questions on perceived business-level uncertainty. Using stock market measures to
calibrate the aspects of the COVID-19 shock and combining them into a model
of disaster effects, they find out that the implied contraction in US real GDP is
nine percent in the second quarter of 2020 on a year-over-year basis and a peak
year-on-year contraction of eleven percent in the fourth quarter. Their work entails
that more than half of the recession is due to COVID-induced uncertainty1. The
medium- to long-run economic consequences driven by uncertainty are of course
extremely difficult to predict, as it is unknown whether subsequent waves will take
place in the future. According to Barua (2020), a possible third and fourth wave
will cause an aggregate supply and demand shock, reducing economic growth signif-
icantly, while a fifth wave will turn the economic recession into a depression. Barua
(2020) claims that recovery from such pandemic-driven recessions may be extremely
complicated and long-lasting, especially because there is a lack of experience among
policymakers and researchers on how to stop a pandemic-driven recession. As the
economic depression is not due to some known factors like a financial crisis, govern-
ments must implement innovative and well-coordinated policies, being aware of the
fact that traditional fiscal and monetary policies may not be sufficient. The lack of
1 While they are able to assess short-term macroeconomic effects of these COVID-induced uncer-
tainties, three main challenges remain in quantifying uncertainty generated by the COVID-19
case (Baker et al., 2020). The first challenge is that the pandemic crisis broke out with an incred-
ible speed. In the US, for instance, the unemployment rate in February was 3.5% (the lowest in
the past 67 years), while just 6 weeks later 10 million Americans filed for unemployment benefits
and millions of others lost their job but did not file (Chaney and Morath, 2020). Because the
outlook changed with such speed, instruments relying on backward-looking statistical analyses
and historic data are not likely to yield suitable measures of forward-looking uncertainty. The
second challenge is the absence of close historic parallels to the current crisis. While the flu Pan-
demic of 1918 may be comparable in terms of mortality (Barro et al., 2020), it occurred in a very
different economic and social context (Baker et al., 2020). The third challenge is represented by
the timeliness of data. More specifically, to predict the current and future macroeconomic ef-
fects of COVID-induced uncertainties, we need tools and measurements that are available in real
time. Although it may seem almost ironic, given that many countries are struggling to contain
COVID-19, humanity is far better equipped and prepared to face this threat than during the
Black Plague. The impressive number of lockdowns that many countries have implemented will
also damage the economic systems of those countries that have been less affected by the virus, as
the world today is more globalised and interdependent than ever before. If governments fail to
implement effective fiscal policies with the right mix, COVID-19 will have a sustained negative
impact on output (Ma et al., 2020).
14
et al. (2020), this uncertainty shock is larger than the one associated with the global
financial crisis of 2008 and more similar in magnitude to the increase in uncertainty
at the time of the Great Depression. Baker et al. (2020) focus on the case of the
United States and claim that we are able to track and analyse the strong rise in
uncertainty in near real time through stock market volatility measures, newspaper-
based indicators of economic uncertainty, and by aggregating over answers to survey
questions on perceived business-level uncertainty. Using stock market measures to
calibrate the aspects of the COVID-19 shock and combining them into a model
of disaster effects, they find out that the implied contraction in US real GDP is
nine percent in the second quarter of 2020 on a year-over-year basis and a peak
year-on-year contraction of eleven percent in the fourth quarter. Their work entails
that more than half of the recession is due to COVID-induced uncertainty1. The
medium- to long-run economic consequences driven by uncertainty are of course
extremely difficult to predict, as it is unknown whether subsequent waves will take
place in the future. According to Barua (2020), a possible third and fourth wave
will cause an aggregate supply and demand shock, reducing economic growth signif-
icantly, while a fifth wave will turn the economic recession into a depression. Barua
(2020) claims that recovery from such pandemic-driven recessions may be extremely
complicated and long-lasting, especially because there is a lack of experience among
policymakers and researchers on how to stop a pandemic-driven recession. As the
economic depression is not due to some known factors like a financial crisis, govern-
ments must implement innovative and well-coordinated policies, being aware of the
fact that traditional fiscal and monetary policies may not be sufficient. The lack of
1 While they are able to assess short-term macroeconomic effects of these COVID-induced uncer-
tainties, three main challenges remain in quantifying uncertainty generated by the COVID-19
case (Baker et al., 2020). The first challenge is that the pandemic crisis broke out with an incred-
ible speed. In the US, for instance, the unemployment rate in February was 3.5% (the lowest in
the past 67 years), while just 6 weeks later 10 million Americans filed for unemployment benefits
and millions of others lost their job but did not file (Chaney and Morath, 2020). Because the
outlook changed with such speed, instruments relying on backward-looking statistical analyses
and historic data are not likely to yield suitable measures of forward-looking uncertainty. The
second challenge is the absence of close historic parallels to the current crisis. While the flu Pan-
demic of 1918 may be comparable in terms of mortality (Barro et al., 2020), it occurred in a very
different economic and social context (Baker et al., 2020). The third challenge is represented by
the timeliness of data. More specifically, to predict the current and future macroeconomic ef-
fects of COVID-induced uncertainties, we need tools and measurements that are available in real
time. Although it may seem almost ironic, given that many countries are struggling to contain
COVID-19, humanity is far better equipped and prepared to face this threat than during the
Black Plague. The impressive number of lockdowns that many countries have implemented will
also damage the economic systems of those countries that have been less affected by the virus, as
the world today is more globalised and interdependent than ever before. If governments fail to
implement effective fiscal policies with the right mix, COVID-19 will have a sustained negative
impact on output (Ma et al., 2020).
14
certainty as a distinctive element is also illustrated in Chapter 3, which highlights
the difficulties in determining the asymptomatic rate of infection in the society.
Social distancing is another element worth to be mentioned, and it represents the
third channel. It optimally starts as soon as the disease emerges, discontinuously
suppressing social activity. This discrete drop in activity delays the spread of the
pandemic and hence buys time. Due to the hope for a cure, this strictly reduces the
expected number of deaths and yields a welfare gain (Farboodi et al., 2020). From
an economic viewpoint, the short-run consequences of social distancing during the
COVID-19 pandemic will certainly be less extreme than those that occurred at the
time of the flu Pandemic, because people in many sectors can work from home and
much shopping can be done online.
The fourth and last channel is the one of fiscal policy. Fiscal policy in the short
run is mainly focused on cash transfers, a more direct tool to reduce immediate
economic instability. Such a tool has recently been used intensely by many Euro-
pean countries, particularly Germany. Cash transfers are useful policy interventions
that help economically vulnerable population groups to cover expenses, mitigate
economic difficulties in the short run, and stabilise economic demand (Fetzer et al.,
2020). Moreover, cash transfers have been shown to reduce psychological distress
and anxieties (Haushofer and Shapiro, 2016; Christian et al., 2019). In Chapter 5,
fiscal policy measures to lessen the negative effects of the recession brought about
by the COVID-19 pandemic are discussed in more detail.
Although a comprehensive overview of general-equilibrium models of COVID-19
is provided in Chapter 6, the economic effects found in a simple framework set up
by Fornaro and Wolf (2020) are already considered in the following. They illustrate
that the spread of the virus might 1) lead to a demand-driven slump, 2) cause a
supply-demand doom loop, and 3) generate stagnation traps induced by pessimistic
animal spirits.
1. The authors begin their analysis with a stripped-down version of the stan-
dard Keynesian model. As in the Keynesian model, employment and output
are determined by aggregate demand. In turn, aggregate demand depends
positively on productivity growth. This is due to the fact that a more rapid
productivity growth raises agents’ expectations about future income, persuad-
ing them to spend more in the present (Lorenzoni, 2009). Thus, a positive
relationship between productivity growth and employment arises. Suppos-
ing that the COVID-19 pandemic leads to a persistent drop in productivity
growth, the effect is lower demand and the appearance of involuntary unem-
ployment. Therefore, the COVID-19 pandemic, due to its negative effect on
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agents’ expectations of future productivity growth, may generate a demand-
driven recession.
2. In fact, productivity growth is at least partially driven by firms’ investment
and, in turn, investment decisions depend on aggregate demand, because, when
demand is high, the return from investment tends to be high as well. This
mechanism generates a positive relationship between productivity growth and
aggregate demand. Given the assumption that the Coronavirus spread causes
a persistent negative supply shock, now an endogenously resulting supply-
demand doom loop occurs. The explanation is the following: the initial neg-
ative supply shock lowers aggregate demand, and lower levels of demand con-
sequently induce firms to cut back on their investments, which brings about a
fall in productivity growth. A weaker productivity growth, in turn, further de-
presses demand, which again decreases productivity growth. Therefore, a loop
takes place, intensifying the effect of the initial supply shock on productivity
growth and employment.
3. Once the zero-lower bound binds, the effects of shifts in demand on elements
such as output and employment are amplified, given the fact that traditional
monetary policy can no longer be used as a shock absorber. The authors as-
sume that agents are less optimistic about future productivity growth and
take into account the zero-lower bound, which does not allow the central
bank to counteract the related fall in demand. Consequently, employment
and economic activity decrease. Firms react by reducing investments, which
negatively impacts productivity growth. Initial pessimistic prospects of lower
growth become self-fulfilling. Fornaro and Wolf (2020) highlight the fact that
such a self-fulfilling feedback loop can occur only if the fundamentals of the
economic system are weak enough. The COVID-19 pandemic, thus, can lead
to expectation-driven stagnation traps by impairing the growth fundamentals
of markets.
Regarding the topic of inequality, it is quite premature to list the possible effects
COVID-19 may have on inequality in the future since the pandemic is currently
ongoing. Despite this, some interesting insights can be observed in the current
literature. According to Chiou and Tucker (2020), access to high speed Internet
explains much of the disparity between high-income and low-income regions. They
demonstrate that, when governments enacted directives suggesting people to stay
home, people living in high-income or high Internet areas were more likely to raise
their propensity to stay at home. Their main finding is that people living in regions
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characterised by both high income and more access to high-speed Internet are far
more likely to stay at home. Thus, the combination of high-income and high Internet
diffusion appears to be a large driver in observed inequality, and this represents
an unexpected spill-over from the spread of the Internet. In comparison to the
analysis of older pandemics, the Internet is therefore a new factor to be considered
in determining the effects on inequality.
2.6 Conclusion
In conclusion, historical economic effects of pandemics are important, because they
are a useful instrument to forecast in a more accurate manner the effects of future
possible pandemics and enable decision makers take action in advance. Such effects
negatively affect labour supply and aggregate demand, influence wealth distribution,
and generate economic uncertainty. The Chapter presents an overview of selected
pandemic events throughout history, from the Black Death of the 14th century to
the current COVID-19 case.
In the first Section of the Chapter, a description of the main features of the Black
Death is provided, illustrating that it lead led to a contraction of the economy due
to a decrease in both labour supply and demand. Unlike subsequent pandemics of
the 17th century, the Black Death caused a decline in inequality, which is shown
in the second Section. Then, an analysis of the 1918 flu pandemic is performed,
showing its tremendous consequences on the society of the time in terms of deaths
and economic damages. Afterwards, the effects of the main 21st century pandemics
are analysed through a fiscal policy perspective, since the existence of better data
allows to analyse fiscal policy only for the latest wave of pandemics. Then, some
insights on the current COVID-19 pandemic are described, highlighting that this
new pandemic may generate a higher economic uncertainty than previous pandemics
as the world is more globalised than ever before. Chapter 7 gives further insights
on economic forecasts concerning this aspect. Lastly, a simple general-equilibrium
model demonstrates that the spread of the virus might cause a demand-driven slump,






As a result of the different pandemics that have afflicted humanity throughout his-
tory until the beginning of the 20th century (considering the Spanish flu as one of the
most relevant up to that date), it became necessary to develop mathematical models
that could estimate the behaviour of these pandemics. It is within this context that
in 1927 the model that would serve as a basis for epidemiologists to conduct their
predictions and studies of the evolution of pandemics was published through a series
of publications by Kermack and McKendrick (1927, 1932, 1933).
These publications were of great importance for the development of statistical
models for the spread of disease and remain relevant in many epidemic situations.
The first of these papers sets the basis for modelling infections which confer com-
plete immunity (or, in the case of fatal diseases, death) after cure. Demographics
are considered constant, because births and deaths are not likely to have a meaning-
ful demographic impact during the disease as the duration of an epidemic is short
compared to the lifetime of a person. Moreover, all community members are ini-
tially assumed to be equally susceptible to the disease With time, the epidemic may
come to an end (Daley and Gani, 2005). One of the most important questions in
epidemiology is whether this occurs only when all initially susceptible individuals
have contracted the disease or whether any combination of the factors of infectivity,
recovery, and mortality will contribute to the extinction of the epidemic with many
susceptible people still present in the unaffected population.
In this Chapter, we will start by examining the basic SIR model proposed by
Kermack and McKendrick (1927). After this, we will proceed to analyse two types
of extensions to this model, which will have effects both on the extent of quantitative
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countries during and after the pandemic occurs. The two types of extensions of
an SIR model considered are extensive testing and the differentiation of population
groups. Afterwards, we will perform an analysis on the parameters that are derived
from the original model and the uncertainty for estimating them. We will also
present certain estimations according to information from different authors. Finally,
we will reflect the findings of this Chapter in the conclusion.
3.1 The Basic Model
Most epidemiological models are based on dividing the population subject to infec-
tion into a small number of compartmentalised groups, each consisting of individuals
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infected people is positively related to the population densities of both the suscepti-
ble and infected groups as these densities represent the number of contacts between
each group. In consequence, the number of newly infected people is given by πiSI,
where πi > 0 is the rate of contacts which are sufficient to cause a transmission per
unit of time (de Pereda Sebastián et al., 2010). Infectious individuals will carry the
disease for a certain period and then move to a state of resistance to the disease.
This flow from the infectious state to the recovered one is given by πrI, with πr > 0
being the rate of infectious individuals passing to the resistant state per unit of time.
Unfortunately, some illnesses can also cause deaths; in this case, a mortality rate
πd is introduced into the model as parameter. We will abstract from this for the
moment, as it is irrelevant for model dynamics under the assumption of immunity
for recovered people, and return to it at the end of the Chapter. In Figure 3.1, the
transition dynamics between the health states of the simple epidemiological model
considered are visualised.
Figure 3.1 – Transitions Between Between the Different Health States in the
SIR Model and Their Respective Probabilities
Figure 3.2 displays the evolution of the mass of the different groups while the
pandemic progresses. We witness the end of the pandemic as the number of infected
people approaches zero while the number of recovered people approaches N .
Finally, it is worth clarifying that the dynamics of the spread of infection depend
on a coefficient that we shall refer to as R0. This is the so-called basic reproduction
number or basic reproduction ratio. We can interpret this value as the amount of
people that an infected person will transmit the disease to if the number of recovered
people is zero (which is the exactly the case at t = 0). It is given by the following
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Figure 3.2 – Phase Diagram of the Different Health State Masses
Note: The Figure depicts the fraction of the population belonging to each of the three health states






By viewing this Equation, we can conclude that R0 will be higher if πi is elevated
(high probability of transmitting the disease), or if πr is low (people are infectious
for a longer time). As we can see, our understanding of this parameter provides us
with useful information to understand and respond to a possible pandemic.
The concept of the basic reproduction ratio can also be generalised and calculated
for later moments than the initial one. The measure is then referred to as Rt, and it
is defined as the number of individuals who will be infected by an infected person at
precisely that moment. This is exactly where the importance of knowing this value
lies. When Rt > 1 holds, the infection will continue to spread, leading us to the
presence of a pandemic. When Rt < 1 holds, however, the epidemic will gradually
disappear.
3.2 Extensions to the Basic Model
3.2.1 Extensive Testing
Berger et al. (2020) discuss the possible benefits of mass random testing as a tool for
identifying asymptomatic infected and uninfected individuals if quarantine policies
are only to depend on observed health status, creating a role for testing in distin-
21
Figure 3.2 – Phase Diagram of the Different Health State Masses
Note: The Figure depicts the fraction of the population belonging to each of the three health states






By viewing this Equation, we can conclude that R0 will be higher if πi is elevated
(high probability of transmitting the disease), or if πr is low (people are infectious
for a longer time). As we can see, our understanding of this parameter provides us
with useful information to understand and respond to a possible pandemic.
The concept of the basic reproduction ratio can also be generalised and calculated
for later moments than the initial one. The measure is then referred to as Rt, and it
is defined as the number of individuals who will be infected by an infected person at
precisely that moment. This is exactly where the importance of knowing this value
lies. When Rt > 1 holds, the infection will continue to spread, leading us to the
presence of a pandemic. When Rt < 1 holds, however, the epidemic will gradually
disappear.
3.2 Extensions to the Basic Model
3.2.1 Extensive Testing
Berger et al. (2020) discuss the possible benefits of mass random testing as a tool for
identifying asymptomatic infected and uninfected individuals if quarantine policies
are only to depend on observed health status, creating a role for testing in distin-
21
guishing between asymptomatic infected and uninfected individuals. They show
that mass random testing of asymptomatic individuals could allow to target quar-
antine to few infected individuals rather than putting the entire population into
generalised quarantine, while keeping mortality rates at the same low level. Due to
a decrease in the quarantined population, Berger et al. (2020) infer that the decrease
in production and the adverse effects on the economy would be much less severe.
However, what does the model imply in terms of testing? As COVID-19 patients
are often infectious around one to two weeks after getting infected, every person in
the population needs to be tested at the same frequency. Peto et al. (2020) suggest
testing the whole population on a weekly basis as a possible course of action. This
could be accomplished by dividing the population into seven groups of equal size,
each of which would be tested on a fixed day of the week. With 90% test compliance,
this would require around 13% of the population to be tested each day. For the
USA, this would amount to over forty million daily tests. To understand what
the policies should be regarding the intensity of testing, consider the following. As
of 20 June 2020, the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (2020) reported
a total of at least 16,998,825 tests performed in the USA. In order to implement
the recommendation set forth by Peto et al. (2020), more than double the total
amount of tests performed in the USA since the beginning of the pandemic should
be conducted in just one day. This would entail a radical change in the industry and
the scope of production of these tests, which would not only require an enormous
amount of capital and time to upgrade the installed capacity, but would also mean
obtaining it from manufacturers rather than clinical test companies and not forcing
any regulatory requirements on this industry to limit costs and ensure supply (Peto
et al., 2020).
3.2.2 Differentiation of Population Groups
The SIR model can be easily extended to the case where the population is differ-
entiated along other dimensions than “health status”. Thus, a further division of
the population into groups defined by age, occupation, geography, or pre-existing
medical condition could be useful — depending on the research question. With ad-
ditional dimensions of differentiation, the SIR extension allows to analyse the effect
of quarantining one group of the population rather than the population as a whole.
For example, Acemoglu et al. (2020) calibrated the model for age groups. As an
alternative, it could also be applied to consider closing one sector of the economy
for the benefit of the rest (Bodenstein et al., 2020).
In the context of age groups, it is simple to comprehend that, while the most
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vulnerable and high-risk population groups must go through stricter and prolonged
closure, the groups with less risk may return to near-normal living and interaction
conditions. Hence, two types of policies could be applied to this end: Optimal
fully targeted policies where each sector has different conditions and semi-targeted
policies where young and middle-aged individuals share the same conditions whereas
those over 65 years of age are subject to harder conditions. Both achieve a decrease
in mortality, as well as a better economic outcome (Acemoglu et al., 2020). In
this differentiation along the age dimension with three age-groups, Acemoglu et al.
(2020) show that optimised quarantine policies could reduce mortality from 1.83%
to 0.71% in relation to optimal uniform policies at the same economic costs.
In a two-sector model, which we will briefly introduce as it will be covered in
greater detail in later Chapters, a central sector is portrayed that produces interme-
diate inputs which are not easily replaceable by inputs from the other sector, and
that is subject to minimum-scale requirements (Bodenstein et al., 2020). Maintain-
ing a focus on social distancing, the authors explain how the lack of such distancing
among workers in the core sector entails a large cost in terms of production and
investment. Special emphasis is placed on social distancing in order to cope with
such consequences, while the resulting number of infections in the core sector drops.
It is worth clarifying that these type of model extensions involve both moral and
social drawbacks, so several factors outside the economic and epidemiological study
are to be analysed by policymakers when it comes to agreeing on which policy to
implement. The benefits of quarantine and isolation are a justification for a certain
amount of state coercion, provided that such a firm justification for these measures
is given by the government (Giubilini et al., 2018).
However, are these measures fairly applied to the extent that certain groups in
society must remain deprived of certain individual freedoms, such as free movement?
We have to wonder as individuals if this is a moral implication that is acceptable
for the common good of society since those groups that are relegated to remain
in quarantine conditions while others have the privilege of resuming their lifestyles
in closer to normal conditions are the ones that suffer the harshest consequences.
Although they are better protected against the spread of the virus, they are also more
prone to suffer from other conditions, since very low degrees of physical activity and
high sedentary conducts are important risk factors for non-communicable diseases
in the public at large (Lee et al., 2012). It is therefore an obligation for authorities
to provide certain benefits, privileges, and support to these individuals in the case
that some differentiation by population groups is made in order to preserve the best
possible conditions for these burdened groups in the context of this pandemic.
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3.3 Estimates of Model Parameters
Taking a look at the works of Stock (2020) and Atkeson (2020), we can find that
there exists a lack of certainty in determining the asymptomatic rate of infection
within society since the tests have been directed mainly at the sick and vulnerable
individuals. The absence of knowledge regarding this rate generates uncertainty
when predicting the behaviour of the pandemic. Due to the fact that we do not
accurately know the parameters, we will not be able to calculate the specific rates
at which the population will become sick and recover (πi and πr, respectively), the
share of it that will decease due to the infection, and the ultimate impact on the
economy, although Stock (2020) suggests the possibility of determining these rates
with random sampling in society. The author finds that, with the same rates of
transmission of the disease in different policies, there are different economic outcomes
depending on the approach to tackling the virus.
The rate of infectious individuals passing to the resistant state, however, can be
estimated much easier since it depends on the speed at which the virus disappears or
kills the host in which it is found. By following the development of several cases and
calculating the average time required for the person to leave the infectious phase,
we can identify πr. According to Verity et al. (2020), the estimated mean time from
onset to recovery is 24.7 days (95% CI 22.9–28.1). In a discrete-time version of the




As for the basic reproduction number R0, defined earlier in this Chapter, the
estimates ranged from ”1.4 to 6.49, with a mean of 3.28, a median of 2.79 and in-
terquartile range (IQR) of 1.16” (Liu et al., 2020, p. 1). The authors also compared
this ratio with that obtained in the previous SARS pandemic and concluded:
“R0 estimates for SARS have been reported to range between 2 and 5,
which is within the range of the mean R0 for COVID-19 found in this
review. Due to similarities of both pathogen and region of exposure, this
is expected. On the other hand, despite the heightened public awareness
and impressively strong interventional response, the COVID-19 is already
more widespread than SARS, indicating it may be more transmissible.”
(Liu et al., 2020, pp. 1-4).
Combining the mean estimates for R0 and πr allows to determine πi ≈ 13%. In
addition, it is also worthwhile to analyse the mortality rate πd to better comprehend
the disease. In Table 3.1, we observe the different πd values sorted by age group for
Chinese citizens in February 2020 and Italian citizens in March 2020 (Onder et al.,
2020). It can clearly be seen how an infection is more risky for older cohorts.
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Table 3.1 – Case-Fatality-Rate by Age-Group in Italy and China









Total 1625 (100) 7.2 1023 (100) 2.3
0-9 0 0 0 0
10-19 0 0 1 (0.1) 0.2
20-29 0 0 7 (0.7) 0.2
30-39 4 (0.3) 0.3 18 (1.8) 0.2
40-49 10 (0.6) 0.4 38 (3.7) 0.4
50-59 43 (2.7) 1.0 130 (12.7) 1.3
60-69 139 (8.6) 3.5 309 (30.2) 3.6
70-79 578 (35.6) 12.8 312 (30.5) 8.0
≥80 850 (52.3) 20.2 208 (20.3) 14.8
Source: Based on data from Onder et al. (2020)
Finally, in this Section, it is relevant to analyse the later stage of those in the
worst conditions of infection, reflected by the proportion of people who die after
entering intensive care units (ICUs) due to the virus, also analysed in Chapter 4.
According to a Scottish Intensive Care Society study on COVID-19, about 37% of
people entering ICUs are unable to recover from the disease (Scottish Intensive Care
Society, 2020). This Section concludes with an overview of the estimates of relevant
parameters below (Table 3.2).
Table 3.2 – Summary of Model Parameters
Parameter Estimates
Recovery rate (πr) 4%
Basic reproduction number (R0) 3.28 (mean)
Infection rate (πi) 13%
3.4 Conclusion
In this Chapter, we have briefly defined and characterised the SIR model, which
was first described by Kermack and McKendrick (1927). We conclude that this
25
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model is the most appropriate to address the current COVID-19 pandemic since the
dynamics of the disease are basically the ones indicated by the model.
We also conducted an analysis of two extensions to this model proposed by
different authors. These extensions are valid and aim to bring to the eyes of policy
makers options that optimise a general quarantine situation. It would be interesting
to investigate the potential future combination of these extensions as we believe
that they could generate a degree of synergy between their respective results. It is
necessary to clarify that more extensions to this model are possible, and the purpose
of this Chapter is to encourage interest in their research.
Finally, difficulties have also been demonstrated within the SIR model since
the uncertainty of the parameters shows that it is challenging to precisely estimate
the relationship between susceptible and infected, as well as between infected and
recovered (Stock, 2020; Atkeson, 2020). This uncertainty is due in principle to the
existence of asymptomatic individuals, who do not allow a real counting of infected
cases. The possible estimation of these asymptomatic individuals by mass testing is
mentioned (Berger et al., 2020; Stock, 2020).
However, certain estimates of the πi and πr as well as the R0 parameters were
presented. This basic reproduction number was compared with that of the previous
SARS outbreak. We also attempted to estimate the fatality rate, which is shown by
various authors for different ages. Finally, in that Section, we presented observations
the share of people deceased in ICUs once they are registered and obtain the best
possible clinical care. It should be emphasised that all the analysis based on Kermack
and McKendrick (1927) is given in a framework in which the appearance of a vaccine
is uncertain. This is the reason why certain non-pharmaceutical interventions, which
we will discuss in Chapter 4, could reduce the severity of the pandemic and its
possible economic repercussions.
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Tim Kühnöhl and Frederik Vulpus
With the spread of the new respiratory disease COVID-19, most nations stand before
the pivotal challenge of implementing effective policies to counter its far-reaching
impacts on society and economy. So far, over 50 countries have implemented an
unprecedented amount of measures in the form of full or partial lockdowns and
guidelines to increase social distancing within and across countries. The goal is to
slow down the viral transmission of COVID-19 and hence to save as many lives
as possible while avoiding a breakdown of the healthcare system. Some countries
have already started to reopen and lifted lockdowns to some degree on 1 June 2020
(Kaplan et al., 2020b).
By the first week of April 2020, 3.9 billion people had been placed under such
lockdown measures called Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions (NPIs) (Sandford, 2020).
NPIs are countermeasures to delay the spread of the pandemic and reduce its peak
and transmission. They are the only measures that are always available and are
independent of vaccines and medicines (World Health Organization, 2019). How-
ever, massive restrictions on human mobility and every-day activity impose signif-
icant costs on society resulting in a contraction of economic activity. Early IMF
forecasts predicted a decline of current GDP by almost three percent for the US
(International Monetary Fund, 2020) partly due to the implementation of lockdown
measures. Therefore, it is crucial to jointly consider the economic impacts and the
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(Kaplan et al., 2020b).
By the first week of April 2020, 3.9 billion people had been placed under such
lockdown measures called Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions (NPIs) (Sandford, 2020).
NPIs are countermeasures to delay the spread of the pandemic and reduce its peak
and transmission. They are the only measures that are always available and are
independent of vaccines and medicines (World Health Organization, 2019). How-
ever, massive restrictions on human mobility and every-day activity impose signif-
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the implementation of NPIs in recent pandemics. To this end, the Chapter is di-
vided into six Sections. The first onep studies the necessity for NPIs, deriving it
from negative externalities. It is based on the research of Eichenbaum et al. (2020a)
and Jones et al. (2020). The second Section provides a short explanation of differ-
ent NPIs. The third one applies a cost-benefit framework to two pandemics already
mentioned in Chapters 2 and 3: the Spanish flu and the severe acute respiratory syn-
drome (SARS) of 2003. Geographically, it focuses on the United States and China,
here in particular Hong Kong. The findings in the third Section suggest that NPIs
have a positive economic effect in the long run and that societies reach the socially
optimal way to reduce the economic recession and save lives by implementing NPIs.
However, the end of Section 4.3, in which we will discuss SARS, indicates that it is
hard to find the right balance, implying that NPIs can do more harm than good in
some cases. After that, the fourth Section assesses different cost models in uncon-
trolled pandemics and provides some theoretical insights. The findings in Sections
4.3 and 4.4 are validated by the last Section, which gives a short introduction into
the latest research of costs and benefits of NPIs during the COVID-19 crisis and
discusses different lockdown strategies and selected NPIs regarding COVID-19. The
sixth Section concludes the Chapter by summarising its main points.
4.1 Negative Externalities and the Need for
Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions
In recent research concerning the economic effects of the pandemic, the standard SIR
model of contagion is used to model contagion dynamics. Building upon that, it is
then modified by including economic activities (consumption and labour supply),
which influence transmission rates. It is assumed that, upon learning of the virus,
households start to internalise the possibility of becoming infected. Endogenous
changes in economic activity, namely a reduction of consumption and labour supply,
lower the individual probability of becoming infected (Eichenbaum et al., 2020a).
With an increasing fraction of the population falling ill, these behavioural changes
increase proportionately. However, the problem is that people only internalise the
chance of becoming infected themselves, but not the problem of infecting others.
After getting infected, people have no need of cutting back on consumption and
labour supply anymore, assuming their infection path goes by without any or only
mild symptoms. This results in a return to former economic activity and more social
interactions as well as higher infection rates since the probability for susceptible
people to become infected rises. This negative effect is referred to as the infection
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externality2.
Another negative externality is considered by Jones et al. (2020): the congestion
externality. It arises from the assumption that the healthcare system of a country
has a capacity constraint, so that it will become overburdened eventually as infec-
tions rise. This congestion of the healthcare system results in higher death rates
because of missing tools and personnel to treat the infected3. Again, agents do not
internalise the effect of them becoming infected on possible higher death rates. A
further assumption made is about the agents’ incentives for staying healthy over
time. Because ”[if ] a private agent knows that she is likely to be infected in the
future, this reduces her incentives to be careful today” (Jones et al., 2020, p. 4).
This is referred to as the fatalism effect. It derives from the assumption that the
marginal value of staying susceptible in the future is reduced by increasing infection
rates, which drive up the individual risk of getting infected. In the context of the
congestion externality, this implies that agents know about the possibility of a col-
lapsing healthcare system, which increases their incentive to become infected rather
sooner than later.
Given these externalities, a policymaker looks for a way to minimise the deaths
while also keeping the economic and social costs at a minimum. The trade-off be-
tween public health control and economic costs needs to be investigated and quan-
tified to give policymakers more insight into a feasible containment policy.
4.2 Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions
While Section 4.1 explains the theoretical need for NPIs, the following Section gives
a short overview of different NPIs to get a better understanding of the cost-benefit
analysis. Moreover, it provides an outlook on results which will be covered in more
detail in Sections 4.3 and 4.5.
The research in this field is limited and mostly based on historical observations
combined with mathematical models. Thus, the effectiveness of different NPIs is
subject to debate and depends on multiple factors such as the phase of the pandemic
and the combination with other NPIs (World Health Organization Writing Group
et al., 2006). Nevertheless, Figure 4.1 gives a short overview of NPIs regarding their
effectiveness to reduce or delay the pandemic and the effort to implement them.
The effort incorporates the costs and resources to implement the NPIs as well as
the feasibility and ethical considerations like psychological stress due to isolation
2 This implies that agents do not care for the health of others at all, while in reality agents do
engage in mitigation and self-isolation until they economically or socially exhaust their resources.
3 The events in New York City or Northern Italy in early March 2020 demonstrate this.
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(World Health Organization, 2019; Balinska and Rizzo, 2009). More details on the
trade-offs for some of the NPIs are provided in later Sections of this Chapter.
The colour of the bars in Figure 4.1 symbolises the severity level of the pandemic
at which the respective NPIs should be implemented. Green NPIs should be applied
at any time unrelated to the level of a pandemic, yellow NPIs should be introduced
in moderate pandemics, blue NPIs in severe pandemics, and red NPIs in extraordi-
narily severe pandemics. Grey NPIs should not be implemented at any time. The
dotted line around some bars represents NPIs on which no research regarding their
effectiveness exists at the moment. Besides, a dotted box around a group of NPI
measures defines the umbrella term for those NPIs. It should be noted that the
following results are mainly based on the influenza virus. Thus, results may not
apply fully to COVID-19, which seems to be different in some regards. For instance,
children seem to play a minor role in the COVID-19 pandemic compared to influenza
pandemics (Schober et al., 2020).
4.2.1 Personal Protective and Environmental Measures
Personal protective measures are the most cost-effective measures for preventing
infections. There is no significant cost, but public compliance and education are
necessary. Face masks are recommended for symptomatic individuals at any time.
Moreover, a high proportion of COVID-19 patients are asymptomatic while still
being highly infectious. That is why, in the case of COVID-19, it is recommend
that everyone wears a mask, at least where social distancing is not possible (e.g.
when using public transport or while going shopping). Yet, it could be costly if face
masks are provided to the whole society and not only for symptomatic individuals,
and thus supplies could be limited (World Health Organization, 2019). The double
colouration of the corresponding bar in Figure 4.1 symbolises this issue. The lat-
est research suggests that face masks could reduce the transmission rate by about
60%, meaning they are beneficial (Turak, 2020). However, abundance of evidence
is meagre (Balinska and Rizzo, 2009). Another simple personal protective measure
is extensive hand-washing. For the SARS outbreak in 2003, studies unsurprisingly
point out that it has a protective effect.
Those studies reach the same conclusion with regard to the disinfecting of living
quarters, an environmental measure. Further environmental measures that could
reduce viral transmission are ventilation, the deployment of UV light, and modifying
humidity. Although the last two could have positive impacts on personal health
state, evidence for this is missing. Additionally, it is costly to install these measures
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Figure 4.1 – Overview of Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions
Notes: Green: NPIs should be applied at any time unrelated to the level of a pandemic, Yellow:
NPIs should be introduced in moderate pandemics, Blue: NPIs in severe pandemics, Red: NPIs
in extraordinarily severe pandemics, Dotted line: NPIs on which no research regarding their effec-
tiveness exists; Own presentation based on Balinska and Rizzo (2009), World Trade Organization
(2019), and World Health Organization Writing Group et al. (2006)
on a large scale (World Health Organization, 2019).
4.2.2 Social Distancing
Historical observations of social distancing show a positive medical effect in the form
of a reduction and delay of the pandemic. Flahault et al. (2006) find that even a
partial isolation of cases could delay the peak of the pandemic notably, which im-
plies more time to prepare for its arrival. However, social distancing measures have
a considerable number of drawbacks. Firstly, they are resource-intensive and have
some ethical issues. For example, contact-tracing on a larger scale requires a lot of
human resources and could lead to privacy concerns (World Health Organization,
2019). Secondly, as we mentioned before, the success of NPIs depends on multiple
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factors, especially in the case of social distancing measures. For instance, school
closures rely on the contact pattern within a society, the impact of closures on these
patterns, the intensity and stage of the pandemic at which the NPI is implemented,
and, lastly, the interplay of different age groups (Balinska and Rizzo, 2009). More-
over, it is important to mention that the NPI “quarantine of exposed individuals”
is classified as an intervention that should be implemented only in extraordinarily
severe pandemics. The WHO does not recommend quarantines at all. The reason
for this is that the WHO only focuses on influenza pandemics. As mentioned before,
it seems that COVID-19 is different from influenza, and thus, the implementation
of this NPI is justified (Friebe, 2020; Robert Koch Institut, 2020a).
4.2.3 Travel-Related Measures
For travel restrictions, practical implementation issues are a key reason against their
usage despite theoretical benefits. Ferguson et al. (2006) theorise that a nearly full
restriction of cross-border travel may considerably delay the peak of the pandemic.
Nevertheless, practical assumptions suggest that, after sustained transmission within
the population of one country, it is inevitable to stop the worldwide spread of a
virus and thus authorities should shift their view to other interventions (World
Health Organization Writing Group et al., 2006). Furthermore, closing borders
carries negative consequences for the supply chain, and it requires a large number
of border guards to enforce these restrictions. In conclusion, travel-related measures
should generally be implemented at the beginning of a pandemic and only for a short
period (World Health Organization, 2019). However, the latest research during the
COVID-19 pandemic suggests that travel restrictions can stop the transmission in
this case, which will be discussed in Section 4.5.
4.3 Historical Costs and Benefits of
Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions
Section 4.2 listed a lot of factors that influence the effectiveness of NPIs. Further-
more, the negative externalities and the costs imposed by a pandemic give reasons
for the disruption of the economy and why individual risk-averse behaviour could
be insufficient to reach the social optimum. However, the economic effects of imple-
menting NPIs are not evident in a pandemic. Correia et al. (2020) describe direct
effects and indirect effects of NPIs influencing the economy. The direct effects lead
to a decrease in economic activity, because people have to reduce social interactions,
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which are a part of many such activities. On the other hand, the NPIs diminish
the spread of the virus and thus reduce the number of deaths. This is beneficial
as deaths can be translated into economic costs through the economic “value of a
lost life”, which we will discuss in Section 4.4; this constitutes the indirect effect. In
total, a decrease in economic activity is most likely inevitable, but could be less ex-
tensive with implementing NPIs (Correia et al., 2020). In order to analyse the costs
and benefits, the remainder of the Section studies the impact of NPIs on mortality
and their direct and indirect economic effects in past pandemics.
4.3.1 Spanish Flu
The Spanish flu is discussed in detail in Chapter 2. However, this Subsection gives
more insights into the cost-benefit framework and focuses on the United States,
because the data there is more comprehensive than it is for Europe or Asia.
The Spanish flu hit the world in three waves between January 1918 and December
1920. Troop movements during World War I facilitated the global spread of the
pandemic, in which up to 50 million people died, including 550,000 to 675,000 people
in the US (Correia et al., 2020). One major characteristic of the Spanish flu was
the high death rate among 18-44-year-old adults (Correia et al., 2020). Antiviral
medication and vaccines were not available, and thus, NPIs seem to have been the
only means to reduce the spread of the virus (Hatchett et al., 2007).
The economic research papers of the Spanish flu compare the economic and
epidemic impact of NPIs in 43 cities in the United States. They focus on three
major categories: school closures, public gathering bans including closures of sa-
loons, sporting events and indoor gatherings, and finally isolation and quarantine.
Of course, there were some other NPIs, such as regulations of business hours and
mandatory face masks (Markel et al., 2007).
The most commonly used NPI were school closures, which 93% of the US cities
enacted during the pandemic. In addition, school closures and public gathering bans
were the most common combination, which 73% of all towns implemented (Markel
et al., 2007). The timing and duration of the NPIs were significant for the course
of the pandemic. Cities which acted earlier and implemented several interventions
experienced a 50% lower peak death rate compared to cities that acted too late.
Moreover, those cities that performed NPIs in an early phase had a cumulative
excess mortality, which was about 20% lower (Hatchett et al., 2007).
Furthermore, the course of the pandemic in most cities followed the activation,
deactivation and reactivation of NPIs (Figure 4.2). Many cities experienced two
peaks of the pandemic. Nevertheless, no city experienced a second peak while most
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of the NPIs were still enabled (Markel et al., 2007). Bootsma and Ferguson (2007)
describe an optimal way to implement NPIs (Figure 4.3). If cities enacted multi-
ple NPIs quickly, this could contain the pandemic much faster, but many people
would remain susceptible to the virus. If the NPIs were then lifted again, a second
peak would occur, which was the experience of many cities during the Spanish flu.
Nevertheless, cities that acted quickly still achieved the optimal way to flatten the
curve more likely than cities which did nothing and faced an uncontrolled pandemic
(Bootsma and Ferguson, 2007). Moreover, Markel et al. (2007) found out that com-
bining NPIs was more effective than implementing individual NPIs. To conclude,
NPIs were beneficial in terms of containing the pandemic and reducing the mortality.
Figure 4.2 – Weekly Excess Death Rate and Duration of Public Health
Interventions in St Louis, Missouri, During the Spanish Flu
Source: Markel et al. (2007)
The following explanations are mainly based on the work of Correia et al. (2020).
For simplicity, we will only provide citations of other sources. Correia et al. (2020)
have taken the findings presented in the previous above and organised the results in
two dimensions. The speed of the NPIs describes the number of days between an
excess death rate above a certain threshold and the activation of NPI measures. The
intensity describes the total number of days on which at least one of the important
NPI categories were in place. With these two dimensions and the results of Markel
et al. (2007), Bootsma and Ferguson (2007) and Hatchett et al. (2007) compared
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Figure 4.3 – Effects of Imperfect Health Interventions on Epidemic Dynamics
Source: Bootsma and Ferguson (2007)
the cities in terms of growth of manufacturing employment, manufacturing output,
national bank assets, and a general change in employment to assess the economic
impact.
For the case of the Spanish flu, Figure 4.4 shows the association between mor-
tality in 1918 and the change in employment between 1914 and 1919. The cities
that had a higher mortality generally experienced a less favourable development of
employment than those with a low mortality. Moreover, cities that implemented
stricter NPIs (green dots) had lower death rates and a more favourable development
of employment.
Figure 4.4 – Relationship of Mortality and Change in Employment
Source: Correia et al. (2020)
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Figure 4.5 presents a more detailed correlation between the intensity of NPI
implementation and the growth of manufacturing employment from 1914 to 1919.
There is a positive correlation between the intensity of NPIs and growth in man-
ufacturing output. This implies that cities which had NPIs in place over a more
extended period experienced higher growth after the pandemic. The same pattern
appears for other economic measures.
Figure 4.5 – Relationship of NPI Intensity and Growth of Manufacturing
Employment
Source: Correia et al. (2020)
The same analysis was conducted for the speed of NPIs and the variables men-
tioned above. Analogously to the intensity of NPIs, cities that acted faster had a
higher increase in economic measures.
Additionally, Correia et al. (2020) estimated the city level outcome in a dy-
namic difference-in-difference equation for the speed of NPIs and their intensity4.
A time-varying dummy for cities with high-speed/high-intensity NPIs describes the
dynamics of these cities as compared to cities with weaker NPIs. They used control
variables such as urban population share, income per capita, or agriculture employ-
ment share of 1910 to control for level differences before the pandemic.
Figure 4.6 shows the dynamic effect of NPI intensity on the natural logarithm of
manufacturing employment. The two groups of cities had a similar growth between
4 Yst = αc + γt +
!
j ∕=1918 βjNPIc,19181j=t +
!
j ∕=1918 Xsγj1j=t + εct
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Figure 4.5 presents a more detailed correlation between the intensity of NPI
implementation and the growth of manufacturing employment from 1914 to 1919.
There is a positive correlation between the intensity of NPIs and growth in man-
ufacturing output. This implies that cities which had NPIs in place over a more
extended period experienced higher growth after the pandemic. The same pattern
appears for other economic measures.
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A time-varying dummy for cities with high-speed/high-intensity NPIs describes the
dynamics of these cities as compared to cities with weaker NPIs. They used control
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1909 and 1914. However, cities that had NPIs in place for a more extended period
experienced higher growth in 1919 but also in 1923. One standard deviation increase
in the intensity of NPIs was associated with a seven percent higher employment (and
thus output under constant returns to scale) after the pandemic. Furthermore, the
speed of NPIs leads to a similar effect as it is seen for the intensity.
Figure 4.6 – Relationship of NPI Intensity and the Natural Logarithm of
Manufacturing Employment
Source: Correia et al. (2020)
To sum up, NPIs did not depress the economy in the long run. Of course, there
was a direct effect of NPIs, which restricted social interactions, so that consump-
tion and labour supply of households decreased. Correia et al. (2020) estimate the
negative direct effect in manufacturing employment from 1914 to 1919 to be 1.4 per-
centage points. However, in the case of the Spanish flu, the pandemic itself harmed
the economy as well. Households endogenously reduced consumption and labour
supply. As a consequence, companies reduced their investments because of labour
shortage and higher uncertainty. Nevertheless, the indirect effects mitigated mor-
tality and hence the economic crisis. However, these effects appear in the long run.
It could be the case that the implementation of NPIs led to high short-run volatility
but simultaneously supported long-run growth. Nonetheless, in the long run, there
was no trade-off between upholding economic activity and saving lives in the case
of the Spanish flu. Hence, implementing NPIs was beneficial and outweighed the
costs.
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The severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) was the first pandemic of the 21st
century; it affected 37 countries on four continents, and caused around 8,000 cases
as well as over 700 deaths (Jamison et al., 2017). The fatality rate differed across
age groups. For example, the fatality rate was six percent for the age group between
25-44 years, which is different from the Spanish flu. The SARS virus emerged in the
Guangdong Province of China. The infection probably originated from horseshoe
bats, and the infection was characterised by a long incubation time of up to ten
days, which is similar to that of COVID-19 (Noy and Shields, 2019).
There are very few research papers that analyse the effect of NPIs on the SARS
pandemic and also estimate the indirect impact of those NPIs on the economy
at that time. Because of that, the following Subsection makes use of a different
approach by evaluating the direct costs of the NPIs in the short run, analysing the
proportionality, and then verbalising the most likely indirect effects of the NPIs in
the long run. The Subsection will focus on the situation in Asia, especially Hong
Kong and China.
During SARS, several NPIs were implemented, for example school closings, clo-
sure of swimming pools, cancelling sports events, disinfecting public places, face
masks, and hand hygiene (World Health Organization Writing Group et al., 2006).
Furthermore, travel restrictions and border controls, in which travellers were re-
quired to submit a health declaration form or be subjected to temperature screening
were implemented (Siu and Wong, 2004). This was also supported by the Global
Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN), which coordinated research, in-
terventions and communication (Keogh-Brown and Smith, 2008). Thus, on 1 May
2003, 94 countries had placed quarantines, limits or all-out bans on travellers coming
from China (Noy and Shields, 2019).
The World Health Organization Writing Group et al. (2006) pointed out the
success of public health campaigns such as medical advice, self-quarantines or self-
recognition of illness. The most essential intervention which was used during SARS
was early quarantine and isolation of suspects. In Hong Kong, 1262 susceptible
SARS patients were required to stay home to be monitored for up to ten days. In
the end, only 34 of them were actually infected with the virus (Siu and Wong, 2004).
The same thing was done in Taiwan, where 150,000 people were put in quarantine,
of which only 24 were infected (Balinska and Rizzo, 2009).
The public health response led to massive endogenous behavioural changes in
the society, which were identified as the core reason for economic disruption (Noy
and Shields, 2019). According to Smith (2006), the behavioural response was driven
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by how the public anticipated the risk to become infected, which was influenced
by three factors. Firstly, the people thought they did not have the same level of
control to become infected as, for example, by HIV. Secondly, there was tremendous
uncertainty about the outbreak of the virus and its nature. Finally, they felt insecure
about the degree of effectiveness of the interventions (Smith, 2006). According to
a survey mentioned in Noy and Shields (2019), 23% of the people in Hong Kong
thought it was likely that they would become infected at this time, while the post-
infection rate was a meagre 0.00026%.
Because of the global response and the interventions, international visitor arrivals
fell by 63% between March and April 2003 in Hong Kong (Noy and Shields, 2019),
which is similar to the situation in the latest COVID-19 crisis as you can see in
Chapter 7.
The overall decrease in GDP was estimated at around $3.7 billion in Hong Kong.
As half of those missing visitors would have been tourists (Siu and Wong, 2004),
the hospitality and tourism sector was strongly affected and experienced a loss of
about $1.3 billion as it is mentioned in Chapter 2. Within the first two weeks,
25 restaurants closed, and 1600 employees became unemployed. Another 16,000
employees experienced pay cuts (Noy and Shields, 2019). Because of the reduction
in tourism and general consumption, restaurants and retail sales dropped by 10-50%
during this time (Siu and Wong, 2004), which was the main reason for the decrease
in GDP.
Nevertheless, consumption was only postponed and started to recover by the
third quarter of 2003. Hence, there was only a short-term economic impact. Still,
there were some irrecoverable losses in Asia, for example, the tourism sector in
Beijing alone was estimated to have lost around $1.4 billion (Noy and Shields, 2019).
According to a report of the World Bank written by Brahmbhatt and Dutta
(2008), the GDP losses of four major Asian economies, namely China, Singapore,
Taiwan, and Hong Kong, were about $13 billion and thus more significant than the
direct costs of medical care and the indirect (economic and emotional) costs from
loss of life combined, which are referred to as the ”costs of illness”. These costs were
atypically low in the case of SARS due to the small number of fatalities.
As mentioned in Section 4.1, individuals internalise the threat of the virus. It
seems that, in the case of SARS, the individual response was already strong. Because
of that, authorities overshot the social optimum by implementing NPIs. According
to Noy and Shields (2019) and Smith (2006), it seems that the economic impact
was not directly caused by the spread of the virus and that the economic shock
was disproportional given the actual danger of SARS. Besides, they mentioned that
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there could have been more cost-effective solutions than general travel bans and
quarantines to reach the social optimum, which supports the insights explained in
Section 4.2. Nonetheless, Smith (2006) expressed the concern that a more severe
development of SARS could have implied a massive effect for the global economy.
This leads to the question whether or not SARS had the potential to become
a large pandemic like COVID-19. The direct effect, as it was discussed in the
Subsection about the Spanish flu, is probably always negative in the short run,
likewise during the SARS outbreak. But if the NPIs and endogenous behavioural
changes lead to a reduction of the pandemic and thus of mortality, the indirect
effects could be greater than the direct impact, and NPIs would also be beneficial,
as they were in the case of the Spanish flu. Unfortunately, there is no research paper
that focuses on the long-term effects of SARS to estimate the indirect effect of NPIs
(Noy and Shields, 2019).
An article by Deuber et al. (2020) in the German newspaper “Süddeutsche
Zeitung” compared the reaction of the WHO in different pandemics such as SARS in
2003, the influenza disease H1N1 in 2009, Ebola in 2014, and COVID-19 today. The
article concludes that the reaction and behaviour of the WHO was exemplary during
the SARS outbreak. Thus, the communication, travel advice and coordination and
critical assessment of research results prevented a global catastrophe.
Moreover, COVID-19 and SARS are very similar according to the latest research.
Another number to compare the severity of a disease is the basic reproduction num-
ber R0. As laid out in Chapter 3, it describes the average number of secondary
infections produced by a person when there are no recovered individuals yet. The
estimated R0 for SARS lies between 2-4 (World Health Organization, 2003). The
research on the basic reproduction number for COVID-19 is not final, but it is
assumed to be in the range from 2.2-3.6 to 4.1-6.5 (Thomas, 2020).
To summarise, during the SARS outbreak, there was also a negative direct ef-
fect of NPIs, as it was experienced during the Spanish flu. However, the negative
economic impact persisted only for a short time and started to dwindle after a few
quarters. Nevertheless, there were irrecoverable losses. According to Smith (2006),
Noy and Shields (2019), and Brahmbhatt and Dutta (2008), the economic impact
was not attributed to the severity of the disease, but to the public response. Yet,
COVID-19 and SARS have some similarities, and the strict interventions during
SARS might have prevented a global catastrophe. The possible benefit, in the long
run, could be that there was not a more severe decrease in the economy, like there is
today. Although an array of indicators regarding this aspect has been given in this
Subsection, a final quantitative assessment of the costs and benefits of NPIs during
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SARS cannot be made here.
4.4 Costs of a Pandemic and the Risk of an Un-
controlled Virus
After considering negative externalities and the insights on costs and benefits given
from past pandemics, we now turn to COVID-19. We do not fully understand
the effects of this virus yet. However, it is possible to use the theoretical models
provided in the recent literature and extend them with the empirical knowledge
gathered so far. In this Section, we will assess the different costs of the pandemic
which are needed for our analysis where we combine them with theoretical models
presented in the subsequent Section. These costs include — but are not limited
to — output losses due to reductions in labour supply and aggregate consumption,
healthcare costs, and the lost value of future lives due to the disease. We will
calculate these losses for the US under the assumption that 50% of the population
(around 165 million people) gets infected, which is close to assumed herd immunity5.
Importantly, we do not account in this Section for endogenous behavioural changes,
which are covered in an integrated SIR-Macro model in Chapter 6. Such changes
would imply additional economic costs, as agents already cut down on labour supply
and consumption endogenously.
4.4.1 Healthcare Costs
The costs the virus imposes on the healthcare system vary from country to country.
Considering the inconsistency of symptom development, the number of actual symp-
tomatic cases varies highly as well. Costs for cases that require ICU (intensive care
unit) treatment are arguably the highest with a value of roughly one year (100%)
of US GDP per capita ($65,000) for a stay of two weeks (Dasta et al., 2005). But
there are also patients that do not require an ICU. Bartsch et al. (2020) estimate
the median cost of a person with a symptomatic infection requiring hospitalisation
in the US to be $14,366. These estimates are based on the data for the Diamond
Princess cruise ship incident presented by Mizumoto et al. (2020). In their model,
17% of the infected population require hospitalisation. With 50% of the US popula-
5 In most epidemiological literature, the state in which the portion of recovered, and therefore
immune, people reaches 70-90% is described as herd immunity. From this point on, further
spread of infection is kept under control. This number depends on how contagious a disease is,
but for SARS-CoV-2 it is estimated to be at about 60-70%, which also marks the end for most
SIR-models in the literature.
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tion infected, that would lead to 27.9 million hospitalisations and a combined cost of
$400.8 billion in direct medical care. In these combined costs, there are no follow-up
costs listed yet (i.e. future doctor visits, x-rays, etc.), which would increase these
numbers. Estimations on this range to up to $4,000 per patient. Furthermore, this
does also not include associated costs like protective gears in hospitals, the price
of which could potentially increase throughout the pandemic given the scarcity of
this equipment. There are other possible costs like outbreaks of worse diseases and
fatalities due to postponing preventive care and diagnosis or increases in operating
costs for hospitals that lack extra capacity.
4.4.2 Economic Value of a Lost Life
In the context of a cost-benefit analysis, we compare the economic costs of NPI
implementation to the value of saving a certain number of lives. Obviously, a lost
life does not only consist of the marginal decrease in consumption and labour sup-
ply. Putting a monetary price on a person’s life is certainly debatable6. However,
comparing different scenarios of virus control leads to the economic problem of eval-
uating how much an additional life saved outweighs the costs of saving it.
In most literature, the value of a statistical life (VSL), or, more correctly, the
value of marginally increasing survival probabilities, is used to approach this prob-
lem. The VSL is the benefit of avoiding a certain fatality, and it can be expressed in
multiples of GDP per capita. For example, the US Department of Transportation
calculates the VSL to be $9.7 million, almost 150 times the annual GDP per capita of
the United States, which is taken as $65,000. Here, the VSL is based on the average
further life expectancy (about 40 years) of a person combined with their contribution
to the economy. Considering that most victims of the virus have a below-average life
expectancy, this value might still be overestimated, with people aged 65 and above
being up to ten times more likely to die after becoming infected (Stokes et al., 2020).
With 50% of the population infected, and assuming a mortality rate of 5.44% —
which is the overall mortality in an uncontrolled COVID-19-pandemic implied by
the model of Acemoglu et al. (2020) (see Subsection 4.5.1) —, around 8.9 million
Americans would die of COVID-19; applying the VSL proposed by the US Depart-
ment of Transportation, the value of lost lives in such a scenario would amount to
around $86.6 trillion.
Alvarez et al. (2020) use a lower VSL of up to 30 times GDP per capita in
their work. While this approach might be more realistic, it implies lower benefits
6 In this book, we will not go over the ethics of valuing lives but refer to a work by John Broome
on the philosophies of valuing lives (Broome, 2004)
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of saving the lives of especially old people. With a higher value, the incentives
for lockdown measures rise because of the increasing net benefits of implementing
containment policies and saving lives. At the same time, it is more costly to risk
higher death rates in an uncontrolled scenario. Another point worth mentioning is
that, with fewer deaths, an economic recovery to the former output level might be
accomplished more easily, because the workforce does not decline as sharply in such
a scenario. Applying the VSL proposed by Alvarez et al. (2020), the value of lost
lives in a scenario like the one laid out above would amount to around $17.4 trillion.
4.4.3 Output Losses
As mentioned before, the labour supply is also heavily influenced by the pandemic.
Apart from sick days and the loss of workforce due to death, productivity might
also be curtailed by cases with only mild symptoms. It is difficult to assess exactly
how many people develop symptoms that require them to stay at home for a period
of one to two weeks until they are no longer contagious. Asymptomatic case reports
vary from 40-80% of the tested population. Gros et al. (2020) argue that 50%7 of
cases develop symptoms that require a recovery period of at least two weeks and an
additional week for 40% of those cases that develop even stronger symptoms. They
abstract from severer cases or deaths and add two weeks for infected to stop being
contagious. In one year (52 weeks), this amounts to a reduction of individual labour
supply of 4.2% for any infected individual. Assuming constant returns to scale, if
50% of the population gets infected once, current yearly GDP is reduced by 2.1%.
For a US GDP of approximately $21 trillion, this amounts to $441 billion of GDP
loss, not accounting for the long-run loss of output due to people’s death.
4.5 Latest Research on Costs and Benefits of Non-
Pharmaceutical Interventions During COVID-
19
A World Bank report by Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2020) uses a similar approach as
Correia et al. (2020) to estimate the costs and benefits of NPIs during COVID-19.
It focuses on four types of interventions: social distancing and cancellation of public
events, closure of schools, implementation of a partial lockdown, and enforcement
7 Numbers are based on the data of the Diamond Princess cruise ship incident in early February,
2020. As the population on that ship was older than the average population, numbers may be
upwardly biased.
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how many people develop symptoms that require them to stay at home for a period
of one to two weeks until they are no longer contagious. Asymptomatic case reports
vary from 40-80% of the tested population. Gros et al. (2020) argue that 50%7 of
cases develop symptoms that require a recovery period of at least two weeks and an
additional week for 40% of those cases that develop even stronger symptoms. They
abstract from severer cases or deaths and add two weeks for infected to stop being
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4.5 Latest Research on Costs and Benefits of Non-
Pharmaceutical Interventions During COVID-
19
A World Bank report by Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2020) uses a similar approach as
Correia et al. (2020) to estimate the costs and benefits of NPIs during COVID-19.
It focuses on four types of interventions: social distancing and cancellation of public
events, closure of schools, implementation of a partial lockdown, and enforcement
7 Numbers are based on the data of the Diamond Princess cruise ship incident in early February,
2020. As the population on that ship was older than the average population, numbers may be
upwardly biased.
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of a full lockdown. Moreover, it analyses the time at which European countries
implemented different interventions (see Figure 4.7). At the next step, it estimates
the impact of NPIs on several indicators of economic activities such as electricity
consumption, mobility, and NO2-emissions.
Figure 4.7 – Share of Countries Enacting Selected NPIs Over Time
Source: Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2020)
The NPIs lead to a sharp decline in all economic activity indicators. However,
the paper also investigated the speed of the NPIs and the impact on economic
activities. Figure 4.8 shows the speed of the NPIs and the change in electricity
consumption. The size of the bubbles indicates the mortality rate of each country.
The same correlation occurs as it was already found for the Spanish flu: Countries
that acted earlier had a lower decrease in electricity consumption.
Furthermore, countries on the right side of the chart seem to have lower mortal-
ity, and thus economic costs related to that are lower for those countries. The same
pattern exists for the change in mobility. Figure 4.9 combines these two dimensions
and compares the different countries regarding an early lockdown and a late lock-
down and the mortality. The chart suggests that countries that implemented a full
lockdown earlier had a lower mortality rate and did not damage the economy as
much (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2020).
Of course, there are a lot of concerns that a full lockdown could harm the econ-
omy, and there might be more nuanced ways to reduce the spread of the virus
(Knapp, 2020). Knapp (2020) warns that oppressive measures could backfire, for
example, general quarantines could put people in closer contact than it would hap-
pen otherwise and thus facilitate the spread of the virus.
Taking the economic trade-off mentioned by these reports into consideration,
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Figure 4.8 – Relationship of the Implementation Speed of a Full Lockdown and
the Change in Electricity Consumption
Source: Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2020)
Figure 4.9 – Relationship of the Change in Mobility and the Change in
Electricity Consumption Associated With a Full Lockdown
Source: Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2020)
evaluating the possible costs and benefits of these lockdown measures and NPIs in
general is needed for policymakers to plan their next steps. Naturally, there are
many different strategies, which countries currently follow to counter the effects of
this pandemic. The following Subsections will focus on these controversial lockdowns
and the beneficial effects on NPIs on their own in the context of COVID-19. They
will concentrate on the theoretical framework of infection rates, mortality rates,
output loss, and medical costs presented in Section 4.4.
The first scenario is the implementation of a uniform lockdown on the popula-
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tion, which is mostly a combination of many different NPIs and their accumulated
effect. This results in fewer deaths and a reduction in peak infections at the cost of a
contraction of economic activity, as will be seen. From this base, we will present dif-
ferent containment differentiations to improve this trade-off, like age-group-targeting
lockdowns and sector-targeting lockdowns, which will also play a role when address-
ing the general-equilibrium of such models in Chapter 6. After that, a few selected
NPIs and their costs and benefits will be explored.
All monetary costs of death will be accounted for with a VSL of 40 times GDP
per capita, which is taken as $65,000. This conservative approach seeks to reconcile
the arguments made in Subsection 4.4.2. Current US GPD is taken as approximately
$21 trillion.
4.5.1 Uniform and Age-Group-Targeting Lockdown
For the beginning, we will look at a social planner whose only means to stop viral
spreading is to enforce a stay-at-home-order. In most of the literature, this lockdown
is modelled to curtail economic activity (consumption and labour supply), and thus
reduces social interactions. This method can also be viewed as a combination of
different NPIs put in place simultaneously to keep peak infection rates low until
herd immunity is acquired or a vaccine is produced.
To study the effectiveness of the lockdown in greater detail, Acemoglu et al.
(2020) implement an age-group differentiation into their model, the benefits of which
will be presented in the following. They separate the population into three groups:
young (20-44), middle-aged (45-65), and old (65+) with the assumption that the
productivity of the old group is zero8. Interaction differences of these groups can
only be accomplished by a targeted lockdown. The authors also account for an
increased mortality rate as a function of intensive care units needed relative to
capacity. There is no testing and tracing available, but recovered patients can be
identified immediately and released from lockdown.
In their comparison model, ”no lockdown results in a peak infection rate over
30%, fatalities equal 5.44% of the population and an economic loss of 14.4%” (Ace-
moglu et al., 2020, p. 20), which is all due to lost output because of deaths. They
note that, in this case, agents do not engage in mitigation, i.e. they do not endoge-
nously reduce social interactions, so in reality, the fatalities are likely to be lower. At
the same time, an economic loss could be slightly higher. In the model of Acemoglu
8 Please note that, as of June 2020, there is a revised version of their paper available, in which they
state that the oldest group does, in fact, provide labour supply to a certain degree. Qualitative
results of the newer version are considered in Chapter 6. While this does change the quantitative
results presented in this Subsection, the resulting implication of possible benefits stays the same.
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et al. (2020), only those previously admitted to ICU die. Using the results of the
report by the Scottish Intensive Care Society (2020) from Chapter 3, this means
that 17.8 million deaths possibly revert to 48.1 million cases in ICU, which results
in health care costs of $2.67 trillion (Dasta et al., 2005).
In their basic result for an optimal uniform lockdown policy, in which every age
group is placed under the same containment strategy, 1.82% of the total population
dies. For the US, this means that roughly 6 million people succumb to the virus.
Economic losses in this scenario amount to 19.3% of current GDP (excluding future
output contribution loss and the value of lives lost).
For the targeted lockdown, Acemoglu et al. (2020) distinguish between a semi-
targeted and a fully targeted one. In their semi-targeted policy, the young and
middle-aged groups are collectively placed under a softer lockdown, while the old
are put under a stricter one. They argue that the mortality rate due to infection is
six times higher for the older, so it is beneficial to place a stricter containment on
them, i.e. to limit their social interaction with the other groups, which is only lifted
with the arrival of a vaccine. This way, the overall mortality falls to 1.02%. Besides,
since they assume the older fraction of the population does not work, the economic
losses reduce to 12.8%. This already imposes fewer costs on the economy than in
an uncontrolled scenario while it saves more lives than the uniform policy. Lastly,
in their fully targeted policy, every group is placed under an individual lockdown
resulting in very small gains compared to the semi-targeted one. This method yields
a fatality rate of one percent and economic losses of 12.68% of current GDP.
One important downside of the targeted lockdowns is that the fatality rate of
the young and middle-aged are not decreased (they even rise in a fully targeted
lockdown), so these groups ultimately pay for saving the old. Moreover, reducing
social contacts of the old generation to zero while letting young people pursue their
life without restriction implies huge moral challenges. However, for the sake of our
cost-benefit analysis, we will not cover these implications and conclude with the
financial results.
The financial results for each policy are presented in Table 3.1 down below. It
can be seen that the net benefits for the optimal uniform, the semi-targeted and the
fully targeted policies compared to no lockdown are $31.6 trillion, $40.1 trillion, and
$40.3 trillion, respectively.
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Output losses 3 4 2.7 2.66
Medical costs 2.67 1 0.586 0.576
Non-monetary value 34.8 11.7 6.5 6.4
Total losses 40.47 16.7 9.758 9.636
Notes: Costs in trillion USD; own calculations; based on Acemoglu et al. (2020).
4.5.2 Sector-Targeting Lockdown
Another form of lockdown differentiation is presented by Bodenstein et al. (2020).
The basic idea is that their model splits the economy into a core-sector, which
provides valuable input, which is not easily substitutable, to other industries, and
a non-core sector encompassing these other industries. Furthermore, output losses
in the former sector lead to ”non-linear effects on aggregate activity” (Bodenstein
et al., 2020, p. 5). The core-sector, for example, includes public transportation,
energy providers, food providers and healthcare workers.
Without any social distancing (S.D.) measures put in place, almost every indi-
vidual becomes infected eventually (90%). With the Diamond Princess cruise ship
values used here, a case fatality rate of 2.6% results in almost 7.68 million deaths
and non-monetary costs of death of almost $20 trillion. At the time of the infection
peak (35% infected), output is curtailed by 30%, so, throughout the pandemic, total
output decreases by 14.5%, which derives to a $3 trillion GDP impact on the US
(abstracting from lost output due to death).
The implementation of S.D. (i.e. locking down those people from both sectors
who can work from home) ameliorates this scenario, so only 80% of the total pop-
ulation becomes infected. As a result of S.D., total output now only declines by
6.6% ($1.38 trillion GDP impact) and non-monetary costs of $17.7 trillion arise.
This leaves us with net benefits of $3.9 trillion. Since no assumptions about hospi-
talisation rates or ICU needs were made, quantifying potential medical costs is not
possible.
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4.5.3 Costs and Benefits of Selected Non-Pharmaceutical
Interventions During COVID-19
After assessing different lockdown policies, which accumulate a variety of social
distancing measures to reduce infection rates, we now turn to viewing two important
NPIs individually. First and foremost, it is challenging to quantify the effect of one
NPI on its own. Obviously, it is also not recommendable to only engage in one
single way of reducing social interactions. Most measures only work when they are
combined with others. For example, it might be useful to limit human mobility
and travelling over country borders, but if no measures of S.D. are taken within
one country, this only works if there are no initial infections within this country, or
if case confirmation checkpoints work as intended. Another point to note is that
quantifying direct costs and benefits of many NPIs by looking at their reduction of
transmission rates is not reasonable. For example, it might be beneficial to advocate
sanitation and hygiene instructions or wearing face masks to reduce viral spreading.
Yet, the resulting costs are almost not possible to assess and tracing back the number
of lives saved by them is instead based on guesswork.
Travel bans and alike arguably have severe economic effects, primarily on coun-
tries dependent on tourism. The US Travel Association predicted these losses to
have a $502 billion US GDP impact (not accounting for the resulting unemploy-
ment). Fang et al. (2020) studied the impact of the lockdown and travel restrictions
of Wuhan (put in place on 23 January 2020) on the adjacent Hubei cities. They
argue that, due to the lockdown, the inflows into and outflows from Wuhan were
reduced by about 76% and 56%, respectively. In their counterfactual simulation,
they find that ”COVID-19 cases would be 64.81% higher in the 347 Chinese cities
outside Hubei province” (Fang et al., 2020, p. 21). Similarly, Chinazzi et al. (2020)
modelled the travel restrictions for Wuhan as well. Still, they stated that even a
90% restriction on travelling only moderately influences Chinese cases if it is not
combined with inner-city containment policies. However, it reduced international
importations of infections by almost 80% and potentially delayed global peak in-
fections by two weeks. So, assuming travel bans are put in place early enough to
stop global spreading, or at least delay it enough for other S.D. measures to be
enforced in countries, they are quite helpful even at possibly high costs. However,
for COVID-19, the transmission effect was at best moderate9, and the restrictions
on mobility inside countries were undoubtedly more effective.
9 Note: Abstaining from enforcing travel bans in your own country while your trading partners
put them in place does not yield any competitive benefits but only prolongs global restrictions
further until transmission is stopped.
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Most of the epidemiological literature agrees that 30% of all viral transmissions
happen at workplaces, schools and universities. Limiting these transmissions offers
great value in saving lives. If one alternative to working from home (WFH) is an
exogenous shutdown of firms, the benefits are smaller output losses and a lower
probability for unemployment rates to rise. The other alternative would be that no
state-enforced closures are put in place, and no work-from-home-order is enforced,
which basically leads to an uncontrolled scenario.
Jones et al. (2020) argue that, with the availability of WFH, policymakers would
still engage in rather strict mitigation strategies but could do so at much lower
economic losses (depicted in Figure 4.10). The reason for still engaging in the
same mitigation policy is that the benefits of WFH are in no way near the costs of
fatalities. Following their quantitative results, the additional benefits of WFH are
that labour supply falls by only 15% instead of 40%. Furthermore, case mortality
also falls slightly.
Figure 4.10 – Effect of a WFH-Order on the Time Path of Aggregate Labour
Supply and Consumption
Source: Jones et al. (2020)
For a straightforward experiment, we will assume that a WFH order reduces the
number of new infections estimated to stem from a single case by 30%. We will then
use the basic epidemic calculator provided by Goh (2019) and use the inputs shown
in Table 4.2, which are meant to replicate the US in the pre-pandemic state. The
resulting reduction saves 889 thousand lives, which leads to non-monetary benefits
of $2.3 trillion. The possible declines of productivity that follow from WFH, or
theoretical losses of human capital due to that and school as well as university
closures are not only difficult to assess, but they are also negligible when facing the
death toll of not enforcing them. Dingel and Neiman (2020) argue that 37% of all
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US jobs can be done from home, so the incentive for nations to advocate this policy
for those jobs is high. These basic benefits of a WFH order are even more relevant
when looking at the possible benefits for the core sector presented in Bodenstein
et al. (2020).
Table 4.2 – Epidemic Calculator Inputs
Transmission Dynamics Size of Population 328,484,431
Number of initial infections 1
Basic Reproduction Number 0 2.5
Length of incubation period 5.5 days
Duration patient is infectious 13.96 days
Day when NPI was introduced 100th day
Clinical Dynamics Case fatality rate 1.5%
Time from end of incubation to death 17.67 days
Length of hospital stay 22.65 days
Recovery time for mild cases 18.88 days
Hospitalization rate 17%
Time to hospitalization 5 days
4.6 Conclusion
The costs and benefits of NPIs are influenced by multiple factors. First of all,
policymakers need to consider the negative externalities arising in the context of
a pandemic. However, disregarding individual internalisation processes can lead
to a state beyond what is socially optimal, as it can be argued for the case of
the SARS outbreak. On the one hand, there are medical factors such as basic
reproduction number or mortality rate, and economic factors such as endogenous
behavioural changes of individuals on the other hand. Also, the costs include several
determinants, for example, loss of human capital through school closures, costs due
to psychological stress and other ethical complications, and costs that arise from a
reduction in social interactions.
Furthermore, the actual benefits of NPIs can only be fully understood in the
long run. This leads to uncertainty to estimate the historical costs and benefits of
NPIs. However, the research regarding the Spanish flu and COVID-19 suggest that
it is beneficial to implement strict NPIs in an early phase of the pandemic. The
effectiveness of implementing NPIs during SARS is not finally evaluated. It seems
as though the direct costs of the interventions outweigh the benefits and were not
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justified by the severity of SARS. But the benefit could be that it did not lead to a
worldwide pandemic like COVID-19 and did not cause the same economic disruption
as we have today, which is discussed in Chapter 7.
Turning to COVID-19, after assessing different scenarios and deviations of con-
tainment measures, we observed that the aggressive implementation of NPIs by
policymakers in the US and worldwide were likely not exaggerated. Given that no
former containment plans were in place for a pandemic of this magnitude, they are
rather justified.
Furthermore, the economic trade-off that comes from implementing NPIs can be
ameliorated when focusing on the epidemiological aspects of COVID-19 to secure
the social optimum. This includes securing the health of the elderly, relieving the
possible strain on the essential sector, or preventing the congestion of the healthcare
system. These strategies do not only save lives, but they also improve the economic
costs social distancing implies. Therefore, it is commendable to put a variety of
NPIs in place. However, at the same time, policymakers should evaluate the actual
benefits and necessity of the timing, placement, scale and duration of these measures.
In the context of this analysis, we did not account for a possible fiscal stimulus
or redistributions by a government. Naturally, such interventions could ultimately
improve the trade-off, especially in the long run, which will be covered in the follow-
ing Chapters. Even then, the economic costs will be severe and the knowledge on
NPIs might be put in question. If this happens, advocating such policies will start
to turn into a political challenge to ensure public approval.
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Chapter 5
Fiscal Policy to Counter the
Recession
Alexander Hilgenberg and Rahel Pretzsch
In this Chapter, fiscal policy measures to counter the recession caused by the
COVID-19 pandemic are discussed. Fiscal policy measures generally have a big
impact on the course of recessions. The curve of the recession caused by the Coro-
navirus disease without any macroeconomic measures is more severe than with ac-
companying measures, as can be seen in Figure 5.1. The Coronavirus pandemic
has caused a massive shock on both the demand and supply side, which severely
affects many industries. If fiscal policy measures were not decided immediately, it
is possible that the period to reach the pre-crisis economic level would be very long.
Without fiscal support, the curve of the recession can be represented by the red
line in Figure 5.1. The blue line, in contrast, represents the economic slowdown if
the loss of economic activity can be restricted. Therefore, our motivation to this
Chapter is investigating the reasons for fiscal policy interventions. For this purpose,
the focus is laid on discussing and evaluating the effectiveness of fiscal policies.
We observe that, on both the supply and demand side, many fiscal policy mea-
sures are being taken to support companies as well as individuals. Companies are
helped with liquidity assistance, loans and guarantees, whereas individuals ben-
efit through unemployment compensations or short-time work, and via measures
designed to ease the burden on consumers and stimulate the economy, such as re-
ductions in value added tax (VAT). Forecasts of the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) predict that this recession will have an
enormous impact on the world economy in the short term. According to the OECD
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Figure 5.1 – Flattening the Pandemic and Recession Curves
Source: Gourinchas (2020)
forecast made in June, the global economy is projected to contract in 2020 by six
percent in comparison to the previous year, in a single-hit scenario. Global GDP is
forecasted to reach pre-crisis level only at the end of 2021. The drop in output of
the United States and Germany is predicted to be at 7.3% and 6.6%, respectively,
as can be seen in Table 5.1 and will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7. The
factors driving the recession in these two countries are the direct effect of the Coro-
navirus and a high dependence on global trade and therefore spillovers of recessions
in other countries. In a single-hit scenario, the growth in GDP in 2021 is estimated
to be 4.1% in the United States and 5.8% in Germany. These forecasts already take
into account the currently installed fiscal policy measures, but they are beset with
great uncertainty, because the intensity and the influence of the shock caused by the
Coronavirus is not yet exactly measurable (OECD, 2020).
After this introduction, theoretical background to the requirement for fiscal pol-
icy interventions is given in Section 5.1. Fiscal aid measures in the reaction of the
Coronavirus crisis, both in Germany and the United States are discussed and com-
pared in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 of this Chapter deals with the long-term impact
of fiscal policy measures on public debt. It is followed by a short conclusion to
complete this Chapter.
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Table 5.1 – OECD Forecasts on GDP Growth
2020 2021
Real GDP growth (yoy, in %)
World -6.0 5.2
United States -7.3 4.1
Germany -6.6 5.8
Fiscal balance (% of GDP) -11.1 -7.1
Notes: World GDP uses nominal GDP weights and pur-
chasing power parities; Source: OECD Economic Outlook
June 2020
5.1 Theoretical Background to the Requirement
for Fiscal Policy Intervention
If governments follow counter-cyclical fiscal policy, they should invest in measures to
revive the economy in order to mitigate the curve of recessions. In phases of recovery
and expansion, however, governments should pursue austerity policies. This idea was
taken up by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), who examined the Keynesian
fiscal multipliers. They conclude that fiscal multipliers are on average higher in
recessions than in phases of economic growth. Their results call for counter-cyclical
fiscal policy. One reason for the usefulness of expansionary fiscal policies during
the Corona-recession is provided by Gourinchas (2020). He defines the goal of fiscal
policy in the recession caused by the Coronavirus as follows:
”The objective is not and cannot be to eliminate the recession altogether.
The recession will be there, it will be massive, but hopefully short-lived.
Instead, the priority is to short-circuit all the negative feedback loops
and channels of contagion that otherwise amplify this negative shock.”
(Gourinchas, 2020, p. 36)
Let us consider in the following an economy divided into two sectors. Sector
1 is contact-intensive and is therefore a driving mechanism for the spread of the
virus. This sector includes companies operating in the leisure and entertainment
industry, for instance, restaurants, cinemas and fitness centres. Sector 2 is not
contact-intensive, i.e. automobile and financial industry or companies with the
possibility of distance-selling. Before turning to the analysis of how governments
can react to the recession triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic, a closer look must
first be taken at the reasons for this recession. In the classical view, a recession
is caused either by a supply shock or a demand shock. However, we are currently
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experiencing a shock that affects both sides of the market as supply and demand
both decline simultaneously Grömling et al. (2020).
Before turning to the analysis of how governments can react to the recession
triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic, a closer look must first be taken at the reasons
for this recession. In the classical view, a recession is caused either by a supply
shock or a demand shock. However, we are currently experiencing a shock that
affects both sides of the market as supply and demand both decline simultaneously
(Grömling et al., 2020). There are several reasons for a negative supply shock.
People cannot work because they fall ill, have to care for a sick relative or look
after children. Exogenous measures like quarantine, state-imposed exit restrictions
or closed borders also contribute to a decline in labour supply. Sector 1 has to close
down due to regulations, given that this sector is contact-intensive, which facilitates
the spread of the virus. Even companies in Sector 2 that are not directly affected by
the crisis must close. These companies have production restrictions if the production
of intermediate goods fails or is delayed. Long supply chains, strong division of
labour and just-in-time production increase productivity, but are very sensitive to
shocks (Grömling et al., 2020). As a result of the fall in global economic activity,
world trade will also decline. This development can result both from interrupted
supply chains and from falling foreign demand, which is a burden on export nations
like Germany.
Moreover, Guerrieri et al. (2020) argue that an exogenous closure of Sector 1
is followed by an endogenous demand shock that causes further closures in Sector
2. This happens whenever the omitted goods do not have perfect substitutes. The
shadow price of these goods increases and the whole bundle of goods becomes more
expensive. Laid-off employees consume less. At this point, even the standard Key-
nesian cross logic does not help, because laid-off employees can only receive money
transfers from the state. When they spend this money, they do not get it back
through their wages because of the closure of their sector. Therefore, the fiscal
multiplier cannot be very large under these conditions. Thus, an exogenous closure
of Sector 1 is followed by an endogenous demand shock and this in turn leads to
endogenous closures in the unaffected Sector 2. These endogenous closures are de-
scribed as an “exit multiplier” (Guerrieri et al., 2020). Banks are anticipating the
recession and the associated credit defaults as well as higher risks. For this reason,
banks are restricting their lending. This leads to increased liquidity bottlenecks for
ailing companies.
Furthermore, demand is constrained by the high level of uncertainty. Companies
are holding back investment and private individuals are increasing their savings ra-
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tio (Grömling et al., 2020). Baker et al. (2020) have addressed this issue and tried
to measure uncertainty statistically in order to filter out an effect on the economy.
To measure the uncertainty caused by the Corona crisis, they have used various
instruments. Baker et al. (2020) include stock market volatility, newspaper-based
economic uncertainty, and aggregate surveys at the business level on perceived un-
certainty. The result of this work is that more than half of the GDP decline in
the United States is due to the uncertainty caused by the Coronavirus. This find-
ing is remarkable when evaluating the impact of uncertainty on economic activity.
However, it is important to mention that this model was characterised by a broad
confidence interval.
In order to break the potential negative feedback effects and keep the “exit mul-
tiplier” small, governments have to support the unemployed and short-time workers
when the contact-intensive sector (Sector 1) begins to close. This will allow them
to continue their consumption and limit the collateral damage in Sector 2. Compa-
nies have incentives to lay off employees in order to save operating costs when they
cannot generate revenues. Normally this constitutes a trade-off between short-term
operational optimisation and long-term business success. However, this trade-off is
strongly biased if companies have liquidity problems. As a result, the long-term
success of companies no longer plays a role in the decision to lay off employees. In
order for companies to make a balanced decision, liquidity support must be made
available. This would also give banks the confidence that companies can continue
to meet their obligations. However, aid payments to companies that are not in the
closed sector must be linked to the obligation to keep operations open and not to
lay off employees. Otherwise, the companies could accept the aid payments and still
cease operations (Guerrieri et al., 2020). At this point, short time working allowance
also favours the companies’ decision to keep their employees. When the economy
recovers, production can be started immediately. In contrast to layoffs, firing and
hiring costs do not arise with short-time work (Grömling et al., 2020). Other mea-
sures to promote liquidity include simplified lending to companies and temporary
waiving tax payments (Gourinchas, 2020). Gali (2020) goes even further, arguing
that direct and non-repayable transfers must go to companies in the closed sector.
Bach et al. (2017) also note that value added tax reductions would specifically
relieve individuals in the lower- and middle-income brackets because of their regres-
sive effect. Thus, these individuals would have a higher income after taxation and
would consume more according to Keynesian logic. In contrast, an income tax cut
would not affect people in the lower income brackets so unerringly since their tax
burden is of an indirect kind.
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Table 5.2 summarises the discussed possibilities for counteracting the Corona
crisis. Most policy actions are supply-side oriented.
Table 5.2 – Possible Policy Actions to Mitigate the Corona Crisis
Policy action Supply-/Demand-side support
Aid payments for companies Supply
Simplified lending to companies Supply
Temporary waiving tax payments for companies Supply
Direct and non-repayable transfers for companies Supply
Support for short-time workers Supply and demand
Support for unemployed Demand
Value added tax reduction Demand
5.2 Fiscal Aid Measures in Reaction to the Coro-
navirus Crisis
In the following, fiscal policy measures adopted in response to the Coronavirus crisis
are discussed. For this purpose, we discuss the fiscal aid measures in Germany in
detail in Subsection 5.2.1. In Subsection 5.2.2, we draw a comparison to measures
in the United States. We have chosen the United States as a comparison to Ger-
many, because the United States are the strongest trading power from the western
world and are similarly economically involved as Germany on a global view (World
Trade Organization, 2019). Another reason is that the United States economy was
simultaneously hit by a massive shock on the demand and supply side caused by the
Coronavirus. Social distancing measures and lockdowns in the end of March put a
strain on economic activity. A comparison is therefore interesting to find out how
these two countries are dealing with the crisis at the fiscal policy level and what
similarities and differences can be identified. Table 5.3 presents a selection of fiscal
policy measures.
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2.6%
Notes: Exchange Rate on 17/06/20: 1 e = 1.1218 $; ∗Bruegel estimates
A list of measures for many other countries can be found on the webpage of
the International Monetary Fund. It is also interesting to compare the global fiscal
policy measures of different countries as a response to the COVID-19 pandemic, as
established by Elgin et al. (2020), who investigate 166 countries. Thus, a cross-
country comparison is possible and can be seen in Figure 5.2. It is noticeable that
most countries have decided on fiscal policy packages of 0-5% of their GDP. The
average size of fiscal policy packages of these 166 countries is 4.5%, with Germany
(at 17.71% of GDP) and the US (at 13.92% of GDP) having two of the largest fiscal
policy packages in the world. Luxembourg and Japan reach the largest fiscal policy
packages amounting 22% and 21.1% of its GDP.
5.2.1 Current Fiscal Aid Measures of the Federal Govern-
ment Due to the Corona Crisis
Germany’s Federal Government has reacted early on to the economic crisis triggered
by COVID-19 with a series of measures. Whereas the first packages in March mainly
aimed to support the supply side including the Economic Stabilisation Fund and
further measures to support companies, the economic stimulus package decided in
June focuses on supporting and stimulating the demand side. The total amount of
fiscal measures affecting the German household budget is 353.3 billion euro and the
total amount of guarantees sums up to 819.7 billion euro. To finance this, the federal
government has decided to take on an amount of 218.5 billion euro of debt, which is
a record amount in Germany. This is the result of the second supplementary budget
that the federal government proposed (Bundesfinanzministerium, 2020c).
On 23 March 2020, the German government introduced the ”Corona emergency
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On 23 March 2020, the German government introduced the ”Corona emergency
aid, especially for small companies and self-employed persons”. This programme
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Figure 5.2 – Fiscal Policy Package
Source: Based on data from Elgin et al. (2020)
includes payments of up to 50 billion euro in total, which do not have to be repaid by
those eligible to apply. These include freelancers, self-employed persons, and small
companies with up to 10 employees who are detectably affected by the Corona crisis.
These grants vary from up to 9,000 euro for those affected with up to 5 employees
and up to 15,000 euro for those affected with maximum 10 employees (Altmaier,
2020). Of the budgeted 50 billion euro, only 18 billion euro have been used and
another 18 billion euro of “Soforthilfe” are added with the second supplementary
budget agreed on in June (Anderson et al., 2020).
With the Economic Stabilisation Fund, the Federal Government is additionally
establishing an instrument that can help to alleviate solvency problems of companies
via various instruments. These are available to companies that meet two of the
following three criteria:
1. Their balance sheet exceeds 43 million euro;
2. They generate more than 50 million euro in annual sales revenues;
3. They have an average of more than 249 employees per year.
The total volume of this fund is 600 billion euro, two thirds of which are marked
as government guarantees of company liabilities which have not to be repaid at any
time. A further 100 billion euro are available for recapitalisation through direct state
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participation. These investments do not give rise to any obligation for companies to
repurchase the shares at a later date, it rather includes the possibility for companies
to do so. Additionally, 100 billion euro are available for credit authorisations to
refinance the special programmes of the Credit Institute for Reconstruction (KfW).
This helps to bridge liquidity gaps, which companies can use to refinance themselves
on the capital market. The Economic Stabilisation Fund thus includes public loans
as well as grants (Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 2020).
The special programme of the KfW is in place since 23 March 2020 and has been
approved by the European Commission. For small and medium-sized enterprises, it
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10At the time of the financial crisis, only up to 60% of the risk in working capital financing were
assumed (Altmaier, 2020)
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Table 5.4 – Fiscal Policy Measures in Germany (decided in March - May 2020)
Aid measure Firm size Money per
firm (in e)
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2020. As a result, the value added tax rate will be reduced from 19% to 16%,
and the reduced rate will be decreased from seven percent to five percent. The
reduction in this tax is intended to strengthen demand and stimulate the economy.
In addition, families will receive a one-off child bonus of 300e, and municipalities are
relieved to compensate for the current loss of trade tax revenue due to the crisis. A
municipal solidarity pact compensates for the current crisis-related shortfalls in trade
tax revenues. To this end, the federal government, together with the responsible
federal states, will grant municipalities a lump-sum compensation for 2020, financed
in equal parts by the federal states (Bundesfinanzministerium, 2020a).
The economic stimulus package will also result in ecological, sustainable and
digital investments, such as in public transport, research projects, a hydrogen strat-
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egy, future technologies and electric cars. The total volume of this package for the
future amounts 50 billion euro (Bundesfinanzministerium, 2020a). An overview of
the Economic stimulus package can be found in Table 5.5.
Table 5.5 – Economic Stimulus Package (decided in June 2020)




Reduction of VAT Everyone no 20 billion demand






the loss of trade
tax revenue









no 50 billion supply
5.2.2 Comparison of Fiscal Policies in the United States and
Germany
In order to compare fiscal aid measures across different countries, Anderson et al.
(2020) separate them into three categories, which can be seen in Figure 5.3.
The first category contains immediate fiscal impulses. This means additional
government spending, such as spending on medical resources, subsidising small and
medium-sized enterprises. Furthermore, foregone revenues, such as the cancella-
tion of certain taxes or contributions to social security, as in short time work, are
included. The immediate fiscal impulses in Germany contain amongst others the
recapitalisation for companies in the Economic Stabilisation Fund and direct grants
to small business and self-employees, as well as short-time work benefits, and sub-
ventions as the cut of the value added tax rate and investments, e.g. in medical
infrastructures. In Germany, the immediate fiscal impulses make up 8.3% of its
GDP in 2019. In the United States, the immediate fiscal impulse comprises 9.1% of
2019 GDP and contains direct payments to Americans, as well as federally guaran-
teed loans to small businesses, jobless aids and investments for hospitals and medical
care.
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Figure 5.3 – Discretionary 2020 Fiscal Measures Adopted in Response to the
Coronavirus by 16 April 2020
Source: Based on Bruegel Datasets (Anderson et al., 2020)
The second category covers deferrals. Deferring payments includes tax payments
and social security contributions which are meant to be paid back at a later point
but are now used as liquidity help for individuals and companies. In Germany,
businesses are allowed to defer tax payments which collectively make up 7.3% of its
GDP. By way of comparison, in the United States employers can delay payroll tax
and payments of social security which collectively make up 2.6% of its GDP.
As a third part, other liquidity provisions and guarantees are included. These are
government-initiated measures such as liquidity assistance and credit lines through
national development banks. In Germany, these measures contain federal guarantees
through the KfW and their refinancing loans, as well as the Economic Stabilisation
Fund. In the United States, there is a government lending program for distressed
companies, which allows administration to take equity stakes. While these liquidities
and guarantees in Germany make up to 24.3% of Germany’s GDP, in the United
States it only makes up 2.6% of its GDP (Anderson et al., 2020).
Another major difference that is noticeable when comparing fiscal aid measures
between the United States and Germany is short-time work in Germany and unem-
ployment benefits in the United States. Before comparing these two measures, one
should take a look at the unemployment numbers of the United States.
The labour market in the United States indicates a collapse with millions of
Americans filing for unemployment compensation. The unemployment rate in the
United States reached 14.7% in April, which is the highest level since the years
65
Figure 5.3 – Discretionary 2020 Fiscal Measures Adopted in Response to the
Coronavirus by 16 April 2020
Source: Based on Bruegel Datasets (Anderson et al., 2020)
The second category covers deferrals. Deferring payments includes tax payments
and social security contributions which are meant to be paid back at a later point
but are now used as liquidity help for individuals and companies. In Germany,
businesses are allowed to defer tax payments which collectively make up 7.3% of its
GDP. By way of comparison, in the United States employers can delay payroll tax
and payments of social security which collectively make up 2.6% of its GDP.
As a third part, other liquidity provisions and guarantees are included. These are
government-initiated measures such as liquidity assistance and credit lines through
national development banks. In Germany, these measures contain federal guarantees
through the KfW and their refinancing loans, as well as the Economic Stabilisation
Fund. In the United States, there is a government lending program for distressed
companies, which allows administration to take equity stakes. While these liquidities
and guarantees in Germany make up to 24.3% of Germany’s GDP, in the United
States it only makes up 2.6% of its GDP (Anderson et al., 2020).
Another major difference that is noticeable when comparing fiscal aid measures
between the United States and Germany is short-time work in Germany and unem-
ployment benefits in the United States. Before comparing these two measures, one
should take a look at the unemployment numbers of the United States.
The labour market in the United States indicates a collapse with millions of
Americans filing for unemployment compensation. The unemployment rate in the
United States reached 14.7% in April, which is the highest level since the years
65
following the Great Depression. During the last 90 years of the history of the United
States, the highest peak in the unemployment rate was reached as an outcome of
the Great Depression with a proportion of 25.6% in 1932 and recovered during the
next ten years until full employment was nearly reached in 1942. Another peak was
measured after the recession caused by the Financial Crisis of 2008/2009. After
reaching ten percent in 2009, the unemployment rate decreased continuously to a
level of 3.5% in February 2020. Accordingly, the unemployment rate increased by
11.2 percentage points after the outbreak of the Coronavirus crisis. Since the peak in
April, the unemployment rate recovered steadily and reached 10.2% in July (Federal
Reserve Bank of Saint Louis, 2020).
A major advantage of short-time work is that employees are not dismissed, and
permanent employment levels can be maintained during recessions. This means that
employers can better match output requirements. Short-time work benefits those
jobs and sectors where there is a fundamental need and demand for goods or ser-
vices. On the one hand, if the economy returns to its previous level after the Corona
crisis, short time work consequently makes sense, unless there are long-term changes
in consumer behaviour. The longer the crisis lasts, the higher is the probability of
systemic changes in consumption. However, short-time work can create inefficiencies
if employments are kept where there is no demand while reallocation to more pro-
ductive jobs would be more effective. Furthermore, part-time workers or temporary
workers are excluded from the labour market; they do not benefit from short-time
work because they do not have a secured job (Cahuc, 2014). On the other hand, the
labour market is more flexible with unemployment benefits rather than short-time
work.
According to Greene (2020), the United States’ labour market is going to recover
faster than that of Europe because of its flexibility, which allows workers sooner to
move to healthier industries. However, she also states that the benefits depend
on the sector in which employees are working. On the one hand, for employees in
particularly affected sectors, e.g. leisure, retail and hospitality, it might make more
sense to receive unemployment benefits instead of short-time work benefits, in order
to use the time to retrain or to reorient themselves. On the other hand, the situation
is different for well-trained specialists, for example in the automotive and chemical
industries, as, according to Greene (2020), it makes more sense for companies to
retain their employees so that they can get off to a good start as quickly as possible
after the crisis.
To give a fair comparison of these measures in Germany and the United States,
other factors of the labour market would need to be considered, such as social
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securities and labour legislation and it is thus very complicated to state whether one
measure is more effective than the other. Furthermore, in the case of the recession
caused by the Coronavirus, it is difficult to predict how the recession is going to
develop and whether there will be long-term effects on the markets. Chapter 7 gives
further insights into this topic.
5.3 Long-Run Impact of Fiscal Policies
The measures undertaken by the German government and the government of the
United States are extensive. Fighting the Coronavirus crisis will mean sharply higher
debt levels everywhere. Figure 5.4 shows that the United States are contributing
to a mayor part of the development of global government debt. But also in other
countries, the fiscal policy measures and the economic stimulus packages which are
already adopted put an additional burden on fiscal balances despite their strong
theoretical justification.
Figure 5.4 – Fiscal Policies to Contain the Damage From COVID-19
Source: Gali (2020)
Figure 5.5 shows the past development of US federal government debt, as a share
of GDP together with a forecast from January 2020 (when the US where not yet
facing the Corona crisis). We see that even before the Corona crisis, the debt level in
the United States was already increasing strongly and expected to continue to do so
until 2030. The Congressional Budget Office (2020) corrected its estimates in view
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of the Corona crisis in April and predicts a debt level in the United States held by
the public of 108% in 2021, implying an upward shift of the projected development
of US government debt. The United States are not alone in this development: debt
levels in most developed countries were already high by historical standards before
the outbreak of the Corona crisis (Gramlich, 2020) and are already increasing further
(see Figure 5.4).
Figure 5.5 – Fiscal Policies to Contain the Damage From COVID-19
Source: Congressional Budget Office (2020)
This development may refuel a controversial debate in the literature. Josten
(2018) argues that public debt cannot act as an efficiency-enhancing instrument
of government fiscal policy. An increase in public debt lowers the growth rate in
the long-term equilibrium of the economy and thus necessarily affects the welfare of
generations born sufficiently far in the future. In the long run, chronic public budget
deficits represent a major obstacle both to the expansion of the stock of productive
capital in the national economy and to the contribution of technological progress
to growth. Therefore, the task of a growth-oriented public debt policy has to be
the limitation of public debt to a narrow temporal and quantitative framework that
does not jeopardise the process of sustainable economic growth.
On the one hand, an empirical study of the impact of debt on long-term economic
growth shows that there is no linear effect. It rather illustrates that, up to a certain
point, debt facilitates growth. However, if the debt level exceeds this point, the
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effect is reversed, and long-term economic growth is slowed down by debts. While
the exact turning point is disputed, evidence from European countries point to a
value between 90%-100% of GDP, with the lower end of the confidence interval being
70% of GDP (Checherita-Westphal and Rother, 2012). In the case of the Corona
crisis, this would imply that most developed countries would take on debt above
this turning point, thus weakening their economic growth in the long run.
On the other hand, Ghosh et al. (2013) have examined how much debt an econ-
omy can take on without the risk of becoming insolvent. Therefore, they introduce
an endogenous debt limit. If the debt level exceeds this limit, the incentives for
governments to run sufficient primary account surpluses to contain debt levels de-
crease. In this case, the creditors do not lend any more money and the interest
rate goes towards infinity. The higher the interest rate rises, the less likely it is
that the economy will be able to service the interest. The probability of a default
therefore also increases. Thus, governments have fiscal policy leeway between its
current debt level and the endogenous debt limit. The average of this debt limit is
approximately 183% of GDP in developed economies according to the findings of
Ghosh et al. (2013).
Debt limits depend positively on average output growth rates and negatively on
the risk-free interest rate. The Coronavirus crisis may reduce medium-run growth
rates which is discussed in more detail in Chapter 7. However, it could also lead to
lower real interest rates, see Chapter 3. In addition, the debt limit increases with
greater willingness to make fiscal adjustments. The equilibrium of the debt ceiling
is dynamically unstable.
If countries are close to their debt limit, a positive shock to the primary ac-
count balance would probably push the debt back towards the long-term debt ratio,
while a negative shock would push the government into insolvency. According to
this argument, the Scandinavian countries, Australia, and South Korea have better
preconditions for the Corona crisis because they have greater fiscal policy leeway.
In Great Britain and the United States, it is the opposite since their fiscal policy
leeway is limited. Iceland, Japan, and the Southern European countries have the
worst conditions (Ghosh et al., 2013). Higher debts of these countries due to the
Corona crisis may lead to a long-term over-indebtedness and insolvency.
Far more optimistic is the argument of Blanchard (2019). He shows that risk-
free interest rates are lower than growth rates over a longer period. This finding is
also not an exception, but a historical norm. This means that intertemporal budget
restrictions no longer apply and states can theoretically incur further debt without
having to worry about interest rates rising and not being able to afford their interest
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payments. He also shows that, under these circumstances, welfare costs of higher
debt are limited.
It is not yet foreseeable what the long-term consequences of the higher borrowings
of governments in the Corona crisis will be. As shown, the topic of public debt is
controversially discussed among economists. One side argues that higher debt levels
hinder economic growth. On the other hand, it is argued that up to a certain point,
debt supports economic growth. Except for Japan and the Southern European
countries, other countries’ debt limits such as that of Germany and the United
States are not higher than the average debt limit of about 183% of GDP despite the
difficult situation during the Corona crisis. This gives hope that the Corona crisis
will not have a serious negative impact in the long run and that the economy will
recover quickly thanks to the stimulus packages.
5.4 Conclusion
In this Chapter, we have shown that the particularity of this crisis is that economies
were subjected to a simultaneous supply and demand shock. Therefore, economists
suppose that the usual measures that are undertaken in recessions might not be
sufficient in this one. A global decline in growth, economic activity and trade was
predicted and can already be seen. The problem in this crisis is that sectors had to
close due to the infection risk, and that an endogenous demand shock was caused
which resulted in further closures. This can be shown by the ”exit multiplier”
(Guerrieri et al., 2020). Governments have reacted quickly with a wide range of fiscal
measures in response to the Coronavirus. These programs are widespread, including
for example unemployment aids in the United States or short time work in Germany
in order to ensure that individuals have a guaranteed income and in order to avoid
frictions on the labour market. Germany has recently decided to adopt measures
to stimulate demand, such as a reduction of the value added tax. Wide access to
credits is given through fiscal aid measures, as well as the ability to defer interest.
Governments are supporting companies with large credit facilities and loans or even
involvement of the state. In the recession caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the
most important aspects result to be evergreening and the survival of individuals
and companies. The fiscal aid measures in both Germany and the United States are
very extensive, and we have seen that the measures in ratio to GDP are larger in
Germany than in the United States. These measures imply higher debt levels. The
long-term implication of higher debt levels in economies are controversially discussed
by economists, as shown in Section 5.3. Because of the economic stimulus packages,
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the crisis results in higher governmental debts. The question remains whether there
will be over-indebtedness. However, the stimulus packages ideally facilitate economic
growth and therefore it is likely that governments’ debt levels will not be affected
in the long run.
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Johannes Brandau and Benjamin Ressel
Since the global outbreak of COVID-19, the interaction of the pandemic and the
economy has been developing into an urgent research topic. Copious theoretical
general-equilibrium models have been set up to study this interaction in an inte-
grated way. This Chapter gives an overview over a selection of such models. To
this end, the key features and main findings of an exemplary model by Eichenbaum
et al. (2020a) are portrayed. Additionally, the effects of several medical extensions
– a capacity constraint on the healthcare system, the prospect of a treatment, the
prospect of a vaccine, and testing and targeted quarantining – on the main findings
of Eichenbaum et al. (2020a) are discussed in a qualitative way. Furthermore, the
impact of several economic extensions – namely different age groups and different
sectors as well as distributional aspects – is studied qualitatively.
Eichenbaum et al. (2020a) find that there is a trade-off between containing the
pandemic and upholding economic activity due to the adverse impact of consump-
tion and work on the total number of newly infected people. A capacity constraint
on the healthcare system intensifies this trade-off. While the prospect of a treatment
leaves it structurally unchanged, the prospect of a vaccine alters the optimal policy
path, leading to a strong containment from the beginning. In a follow-up paper,
Eichenbaum et al. (2020b) find that testing and targeted quarantine make it pos-
sible to mitigate the trade-off through smart containment. Acemoglu et al. (2020)
introduce a model with different age groups. They find that the differentiation of
age groups allows for the implementation of a targeted lockdown, which distributes
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introduce a model with different age groups. They find that the differentiation of
age groups allows for the implementation of a targeted lockdown, which distributes
the costs of a shut-down among the age groups in proportion to their respective
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benefits and outperforms a uniform lockdown policy regarding both the severity of
the recession associated with it and the total number of deaths prevented by it,
mitigating the trade-off established by Eichenbaum et al. (2020a) as well. Glover
et al. (2020) simultaneously consider age- and sector-related heterogeneity. They
find that the old benefit the most from a shut-down, while young people working
in the sector that is subject to the shut-down bear the bulk of the costs, which im-
plies a conflict of generations, contradicting the findings of Acemoglu et al. (2020).
Moreover, Glover et al. (2020) study distributional aspects as a possible solution to
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state that liquidity matters in such a way that households with low medium income,
which are usually employed in occupations with a low level of flexibility, are the
most adversely affected. Bodenstein et al. (2020) study sector-related heterogeneity
using a set of assumptions which differs from that of Glover et al. (2020). Under
their assumptions, they find that partial economic shutdowns are beneficial. Finally,
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a way that the majority of infections can be mitigated without the need of shutting
down the economic activity.
The remainder of this Chapter is structured as follows: In the next Section, the
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research are pointed out. Finally, the Chapter concludes with a summary of its key
takeaways.
6.1 An Exemplary Model
In order to illustrate how the interaction of the pandemic and the economy can be
studied in an integrated model, this Section portrays the key features and main find-
ings of an exemplary general-equilibrium model of COVID-19 by Eichenbaum et al.
(2020a). They find that susceptible people internalise the infection risk associated
with consuming and working and endogenously cut back on economic activity as
the pandemic runs its course. Note that, in reality, this may not be enough to offset
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link between economic activity and the course of the pandemic at all. Hence, they
cause a negative externality. To alleviate this, the government can seek to contain
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economic activity through a tax on consumption. Crucially, there is a trade-off
between containing the pandemic and upholding economic activity in the short run.
For the epidemiological side, Eichenbaum et al. (2020a) build on the SIR model
by Kermack and McKendrick (1927), which is described in detail in Chapter 3 of
this thesis. There are three health states an agent can be in: susceptible S, infected
I, and recovered R. Agents in different groups pursue consumption Cjt and work
N jt , where the index j = (s, i, r) labels the three different groups. All agents are
always entirely aware of their health state. Upon recovery, an individual is assumed
to be fully immune to the disease. Kermack and McKendrick (1927) assume that all
rates of transition between health states in the laws of motion governing population
dynamics are exogenous. In contrast to that, Eichenbaum et al. (2020a) only assume
the recovery and the mortality rate, πr and πd, to be exogenous in their basic model.
The total number of newly infected people Tt in each period t is endogenised. It
establishes the link between economic activity, i.e. consumption Cjt and total hours









t ) + π3StIt. (6.1)
This Equation reflects the fact that infections can arise in three different ways
in the model. Firstly, they can take place during consumption. This is represented






t is the total consumption expenditure of
susceptible people, ItC
i
t is the total consumption expenditure of infected people,
and π1 is the probability of an infection arising from an interaction while consuming.
The number of infections happening during consumption rises with the number of
infected people as well as the respective consumption activities of both infected and
susceptible people. Secondly, infections can take place at work. In Equation (6.1),
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t is the total number of
hours worked by susceptible people, ItN
i
t is the total number of hours worked by
infected people, and π2 is the probability of an infection arising from an interaction at
work. Likewise, the number of infections happening at work rises with the number
of infected people as well as the respective total hours worked by both infected
and susceptible people. Lastly, infections can arise from random meetings. This is
represented by the term π3StIt where St is the number of susceptible people, It is
the number of infected people, and π3 is the probability of an infection arising from
an interaction during a random meeting. To conclude, Equation (6.1) embodies the
assumption that the total number of newly infected people increases with economic
activity. When π1 and π2 are both set to zero, i.e. when it is assumed that there is no
direct link between economic activity and the course of the pandemic, the Equation
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collapses into the exogenous law of motion for the number of newly infected people
which is used in the SIR model by Kermack and McKendrick (1927) as described in
Chapter 3.
In the economic sphere of the model, agents solve maximisation problems which
differ depending on their health state. A recovered agent’s lifetime utility at time t,
U rt , is given by:




t ) + βU
r
t+1. (6.2)
It is the sum of momentary utility u(crt , n
r
t ) and future utility U
r
t+1, which is
discounted by a factor β. This Equation reflects the assumption that individu-
als acquire full immunity upon recovery. Thus, recovered individuals do not face
uncertainty about their future health state.
A susceptible agent’s lifetime utility at time t, U st , is given by:




t) + β[(1− τt)U st+1 + τtU it+1]. (6.3)
It is the sum of momentary utility u(cst , n
s
t) and discounted expected future utility
(1 − τt) U st+1 + τtU it+1. Unlike recovered agents, susceptible agents do face uncer-
tainty about their future health state. To this end, τt denotes the probability for a









t ) + π3It. (6.4)
Since cst and n
s
t respectively denote individual consumption and individual hours
worked, Equation (6.4) states that the individual probability of infection, τt, rises
with individual economic activity. The fact that it is a constraint in the susceptible
agents’ maximisation problem means that those agents internalise the link between
economic activity and the course of the pandemic, and they understand that de-
creasing their consumption and hours worked reduces their risk of getting infected.
Consequently, they endogenously cut back on economic activity during the pandemic
because becoming infected entails the risk of dying, reducing the lifetime utility of
an infected person, U it . As described in Chapter 2 this has been observed during the
Spanish flu, when people decreased their labour supply due to self-isolation mea-
sures. The more infected people there are, the more strongly susceptible agents
reduce their economic activity.
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An infected agent’s lifetime utility at time t, U it , is given by:




t) + β[(1− πrπd)U it+1 + πrU rt+1]. (6.5)
Its structure is analogous to that of the lifetime utility of a susceptible agent.
With probability πr, infected agents recover. With probability (1− πr − πd), these
agents stay infected. With probability πd, they die and lose all future utility. Criti-
cally, Equation (6.5) shows that infected agents do not internalise the link between
economic activity and the course of the pandemic. They do not cut back on economic
activity endogenously during the pandemic, posing an increased risk of infection to
susceptible individuals. That is why they cause a negative externality. Conse-
quently, the endogenous reduction of economic activity undertaken by susceptible
agents during the pandemic is not enough to contain the disease. This justifies non-
pharmaceutical interventions by the government to counter the pandemic, which are
discussed in detail in Chapter 4.
Eichenbaum et al. (2020a) model such containment measures as a tax on con-
sumption. It is included as the parameter µt in the budget constraint for the max-




jnjt + Γt. (6.6)
The term wtφ
jnjt denotes income from labour where wt is the real wage. φ
j
is a labour productivity parameter. It equals one for susceptible and recovered
individuals and is smaller than one for infected individuals. This embodies the as-
sumption that infected individuals cannot supply labour to their full potential. Γt is
a lump-sum transfer from the government. The consumption tax µt represents the
containment rate. When the government raises it, consumption becomes more ex-
pensive, causing agents to reduce consumption in order to comply with their budget
constraint. This reduction in consumption leads to a general decrease in economic
activity. Consequently, less infections arise from consumption and working. The
higher the tax rate µt is set, the more pronounced this effect is. In the scope of the
model, the purpose of containment is the internalisation of the negative externality
caused by infected agents. Eichenbaum et al. (2020a) derive from this that it is op-
timal to gradually intensify containment when the number of infected people, and
with it the magnitude of the negative externality they cause, rises. In the presence
of such measures, all agents cut back on consumption and work, because the govern-
ment imposes its containment regardless of individual health states. That is why a
government intervention causes a recession that is more severe than if there was no
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such intervention. Thus, there exists a trade-off between containing the pandemic
and upholding economic activity. In Chapter 7, several forecasts on the severity of
the recession caused by the shut-down are presented.
6.2 Medical Extensions
This Section studies the impact of several medical extensions on the implications of
the basic model described in the previous Section. Firstly, three extensions consid-
ered by Eichenbaum et al. (2020a) – a capacity constraint on the healthcare system,
the prospect of a treatment, and the prospect of a vaccine – are presented. Then,
testing and targeted quarantine are introduced (Eichenbaum et al., 2020b).
In the presence of a capacity constraint on the healthcare system, the mortal-
ity rate needs to be endogenised, rising with the number of infected people. This
reflects a congestion externality, which is described in Chapter 4. Hence, the cost
of the negative externality caused by infected people increases. Because of this,
the endogenous cutback in economic activity undertaken by agents internalising the
link between economic activity and the course of the pandemic is stronger than in
the basic model. However, as stated before, this may not suffice to contain the
pandemic. Moreover, Jones et al. (2020) argue that agents who have not yet been
infected may become more careless under the prospect of a future collapse of the
healthcare system. This leads to a weaker endogenous cutback in economic activity
by them, contradicting the findings of Eichenbaum et al. (2020a). This is called
fatalism effect, and it is described in more detail in Chapter 4. In both cases, con-
tainment measures need to be more intense than in the basic model to offset the
higher costs associated with the negative externality, implying a more pronounced
trade-off between containing the pandemic and upholding economic activity.
Eichenbaum et al. (2020a) assume that the mortality rate instantly becomes
zero when a treatment is discovered. Hence, introducing the mere possibility of a
treatment reduces the perceived costs associated with an infection in the model.
Consequently, agents are less risk-averse and endogenously cut back on economic
activity less, which leads to a milder recession. Since infected people still cause a
negative externality until a treatment is discovered, a government intervention to
contain the pandemic is still necessary, upholding the trade-off.
According to Eichenbaum et al. (2020a), the total number of newly infected
people is assumed to become zero instantly upon the discovery of a vaccine, which
implies the population instantly reaches herd immunity. Hence, introducing the mere
prospect of a vaccine reduces the perceived infection risk in the model. Analogous
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to the possibility of a treatment, agents are less risk-averse and endogenously cut
back on economic activity less, which leads to a milder recession. Since the actual
infection risk is unchanged until a vaccine is discovered, a government intervention
to contain the pandemic is still necessary. However, the optimal containment policy
with the prospect of a vaccine is different from the one in the basic model. It is
optimal to introduce intense containment measures immediately instead of gradually
intensifying them when the number of infected people rises. The reason for this is
that each infection which does not occur before the arrival of a vaccine is an infection
that, by definition, never occurs. Consequently, heavily reducing infections from the
beginning minimises the total death toll of the pandemic. Likewise, the trade-
off established in the basic model remains. All other modifications studied here
assume that herd immunity can only be reached through large-scale infestation of the
population. Since this implies a large number of infected people, leading to a large
death toll, it is undesirable in reality. That is why, out of the three modifications
studied so far in this Section, the vaccine-version of the model resembles reality the
most.
This part presents the findings of the follow-up paper of Eichenbaum et al.
(2020b), where they introduce the process of testing people for the virus to the
SIR-based macroeconomic model by Eichenbaum et al. (2020a). According to the
World Health Organization (2020b), one of the most critical transmission routes for
the novel Coronavirus is via aerosol droplets when individuals come into close contact
with an infectious person. Usually, an infected person that develops the COVID-19-
specific symptoms would limit these social contacts in order to prevent others from
getting infected. Furthermore, an infected person that gets tested positive for the
virus will be put in quarantine until this person is not infectious anymore. However,
a significant fraction of infected individuals never shows any symptoms of the dis-
ease, i.e. they stay asymptomatic. Mizumoto et al. (2020) found after analysing the
COVID-19 cases on the cruise ship ”Diamond Princess”, that up to every second
case appears to be asymptomatic. These asymptomatic cases play a challenging role
in the containment of the disease. If public health departments only test people who
show symptoms, the asymptomatic but infectious ones will not get identified, and
therefore, quarantining these people is not possible.
Eichenbaum et al. (2020b) analyse the effects of testing on the economy and the
dynamics of the pandemic. Basically, they find that testing with targeted quaran-
tines of positive-tested individuals can have beneficial effects on both the severity
of the recession and the health outcomes of the pandemic.
For the epidemiological side of the model, they build upon the modified version
78
of the SIR model described in Section 6.2 and introduce unknown health states of
individuals. Only a test can reveal their true health state, i.e. whether they are
infected or not. Concerning the question of whether recovered individuals acquire
permanent immunity, two versions of this model are considered: one in which people
acquire permanent immunity and another in which they do not.
Eichenbaum et al. (2020b) implement the process of testing as follows: They as-
sume that tests are perfectly accurate and, therefore, cannot provide false-positive
or false-negative results. Moreover, they impose that, each period, a constant frac-
tion α of previously untested individuals gets tested for COVID-19. They simplify
this model by abstracting from the need to test previously negative-tested people
again in the future. Therefore, it does not matter at which time a person enters the
testing pool. An individual that has already been tested will get informed if their
health state changes. This property of tests can also be found in a model by Berger
et al. (2020), who call this feature a ”tagging-property”.11
Firstly, Eichenbaum et al. (2020b) analyse a version of the model where testing
is performed without quarantining infected individuals. They find that, relative to
the basic model of Eichenbaum et al. (2020a), the adverse effects on the economic
activity and health outcomes of the pandemic are even worse. They explain this as
follows:
”People who are unsure about their health status are likely to reduce their
economic activity to lower the risk of becoming infected. But if they get
tested and find they are infected, they will reduce their economic activity
by less. The reason is simple- they can’t be hurt by further exposure
to the virus. With more infected people shopping and working, social
interactions become more risky for non-infected people who respond by
cutting back on their economic activity.“ (Eichenbaum et al., 2020b, p.
2)
Thus, the negative externality, as described in the previous Section of this Chap-
ter, remains and the government is forced to address this problem.
According to Eichenbaum et al. (2020b), the implementation of testing into an
integrated-assessment model allows the government to impose targeted quarantine
measures, which they call ”smart containment” measures. These measures work as
follows: If a person gets tested positive for COVID-19, the government will limit
11 In reality, negatively-tested people need to be tested regularly to confirm their health status.
The ”tagging-property” is therefore equivalent to a world, where the pool of tested people is
expanded by a constant fraction of the population every period (i.e., a world with linearly
increasing testing capacities).
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all social interactions which are related to the economic activities of this person.
The infected person can consume through channels which bypass social interactions
until the recovery from the disease. In Germany, we can observe a similar kind of
quarantine measures: The public health department sends an infected person into
quarantine for at least two weeks. During this period, the person is not allowed to
engage in social interactions outside their own home. Otherwise, the person may
face hefty fines. However, the health department cannot prohibit social interactions
with family members. The significant difference is that in Germany, only people
who show symptoms for COVID-19 or have been in contact with confirmed cases
get tested. In the described model, people get tested regardless of the occurrence of
specific symptoms or contacts.
They find that this ”smart containment” can drastically improve the trade-off
between economic activity and health outcomes of the pandemic: Firstly, the model
with testing and targeted quarantines can help to reduce both the peak of infection
rates and the death rate. Secondly, it helps to mitigate the severity of the recession
by reducing the decline in equilibrium consumption compared to the basic model of
Eichenbaum et al. (2020a) without testing. Eichenbaum et al. (2020b) state that
this improvement is based on two effects: On the one hand, fewer people get infected,
and therefore, more people can consume without heavy restrictions, relative to the
basic model. On the other hand, the government can differentiate policy measures.
In addition to the universal consumption tax, it imposes quarantines on individuals
that are infected. Therefore, these people cannot participate in social interactions
that are related to economic activities anymore. As a result, the risk of getting
infected during consumption or work activities for a susceptible person decreases
and these people will reduce their consumption and labour supply by less compared
to the Eichenbaum et al. (2020a) model. Apart from that, they find that an increase
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activities. Thus, also limiting these non-economic social interactions has strongly
beneficial effects on the severity of the recession as well as the health outcomes of
the pandemic. Of course, as also mentioned in the paper, this type of measure is
more difficult to implement in reality. Therefore, they refer to the results based on
this policy as an upperbound of possible improvements compared to the basic model
of Eichenbaum et al. (2020a).
In the described model framework, Eichenbaum et al. (2020b) assume that under
the ”smart containment” policy, the population will reach herd-immunity. However,
according to the World Health Organization (2020a), there is no final answer to the
question of whether a recovered person acquires permanent immunity or not. There-
fore, the paper also includes an analysis of a version of the model where the immunity
of recovered individuals only holds temporarily. They find that there are recurring
waves of infections which are co-occurred by recessions in the model without testing
and targeted quarantine. These re-infection waves decrease in severity over time.
In this model, ”smart containment” also helps to reduce the decline in economic
activity, as well as the peak of infections, during the outbreak of the pandemic.
According to the findings of the paper, it can be used as a policy to prevent a future
resurgence of the disease. More precisely, under the ”smart containment” policy
imposed in the Eichenbaum et al. (2020b) model, future outbreaks of the disease, as
well as recurring recessions, can be eliminated. As before, an intensification of the
policy towards the ”strict containment” policy further improves the economic and
health outcomes of the pandemic.
To sum it up, Eichenbaum et al. (2020b) find that testing together with targeted
quarantine serves as a reliable policy instrument in order to mitigate the pandemic
while minimising the adverse economic effects of the lockdown. Therefore, they state
that ”society [. . . ] [should] invest in the required infrastructure to engage in con-
tinuous testing of the population and quarantining of those infected” (Eichenbaum
et al., 2020b, p. 25).
6.3 Economic Extensions
In this Section, the effects of several heterogeneities on the main findings of Eichen-
baum et al. (2020a) are studied. Namely, different age groups, different sectors, and
distributional aspects are considered. When studying a pandemic, age is an impor-
tant source of heterogeneity to control for. Like many diseases, COVID-19 does not
affect all age groups symmetrically. The elderly, for example, are more prone to
experience severe courses of it (Ferguson et al., 2020). Based on this assumption,
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Acemoglu et al. (2020) introduce a model taking heterogeneity caused by age into
account. In contrast to Eichenbaum et al. (2020a), containment is not modelled as
a tax on consumption, i.e. a demand-side policy, but as a shut-down of economic
activity in which the government asks a fraction of workers to stay at home, i.e. a
supply-side policy. According to Acemoglu et al. (2020), the differentiation of age
groups allows for the implementation of a targeted lockdown, which outperforms
a uniform lockdown policy regarding both the severity of the recession associated
with it and the total number of deaths prevented by it, as was shown in Chapter 4.
This implies a mitigation of the trade-off established by Eichenbaum et al. (2020a).
The existence of different sectors in the economy is another significant source of
heterogeneity. Glover et al. (2020) set up a model which considers different age
groups and different sectors simultaneously. In terms of sectoral activity, they dif-
ferentiate between a basic sector and a luxury sector. In contrast to Acemoglu et al.
(2020), they assume that only workers in the luxury sector, who are part of the
young age group, can be subject to a lockdown, because the basic sector cannot
be shut down at all. Consequently, the costs of the lockdown are not distributed
among the different population groups in proportion to their respective gains from it,
which contradicts the findings of Acemoglu et al. (2020). According to Glover et al.
(2020), redistributive measures can mediate this conflict of generations. However,
they cause redistribution costs, which influence the optimal mitigation strategy. In
addition, Kaplan et al. (2020a) consider households with different levels of job flexi-
bility and social components. They find that households with low levels of liquidity
are affected the most. Another model taking sector-related heterogeneity into ac-
count is the one set up by Bodenstein et al. (2020). In contrast to Glover et al.
(2020), Bodenstein et al. (2020) assume a minimum scale requirement for a core
sector and low substitutability between the respective intermediate goods provided
by the sectors, which are needed to produce a final output good. Additionally, they
abstract from age-related heterogeneity. They find that, under these assumptions,
partial economic shutdowns are beneficial. The reason for this is that the supply
chain of the economy gets disrupted when too many workers of the core sector are
unable to provide labour due to being sick, and a partial shut-down can avert such
a scenario. The last model we describe in this Section is by Krueger et al. (2020).
They introduce heterogeneous sectors with the possibility of substituting consump-
tion and work from settings with high risks of infections to settings with a lower
risk. In this framework, they find that most infections can be prevented without the
need for governmental interventions. People will change their consumption habits
endogenously in order to lower their risk of getting infected. A sharp decline in
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economic activity, like in the model of Eichenbaum et al. (2020a), can be ruled out
in this setting. This Section firstly studies the impact of age-related heterogeneity
as modelled by Acemoglu et al. (2020). Secondly, the model of Glover et al. (2020)
is discussed. Then, the findings of Kaplan et al. (2020a) are presented as a supple-
mentary view on distributional aspects. After this, different sectors as modelled by
Bodenstein et al. (2020) are considered. Lastly, the model by Krueger et al. (2020)
is contemplated.
Acemoglu et al. (2020) consider a setting in which the population is divided
into a set of different age groups where it is assumed that older age groups face
higher risks from an infection than younger ones. To this end, they extend the
epidemiological framework by assuming that older age groups are more likely to die.
All age groups supply labour to a certain degree and can be subject to a group-
specific lockdown policy. According to Acemoglu et al. (2020), it is optimal to
introduce a targeted lockdown. Specifically, the older an age group is, the stricter is
the lockdown policy directed at it, i.e. the higher is the fraction of said age group put
under a lockdown order. Under such circumstances, the more an age group benefits
from a shut-down, the more of the costs of said shut-down it bears. Thus, the
costs of the shut-down are distributed among the population groups in proportion
to their respective gains from it. Moreover, the trade-off between containing the
pandemic and upholding economic activity established by Eichenbaum et al. (2020a)
is mitigated. As described in Chapter 4, Acemoglu et al. (2020) find that a targeted
lockdown policy outperforms a uniform lockdown policy regarding both the severity
of the recession associated with it and the total number of deaths prevented by it.
The framework Glover et al. (2020) use to introduce both age- and sector-related
heterogeneity into an integrated assessment model of COVID-19 and the economy is
as follows. The population is divided into two age groups: the young and the old. As
before, the old bear a higher risk than the young. However, it is assumed that only
the young supply labour and the old do not. Hence, the young are further divided
into sub-groups based on what sector they supply their labour to. There is a basic
sector and a luxury sector. The basic sector cannot be shut down. This reflects the
fact that Glover et al. (2020) think of this sector as the one encompassing essential
goods and services, like healthcare. The government can reduce economic activity in
the luxury sector by asking a fraction of workers in this sector to stay at home and not
work. The extent of this fraction directly reflects the strength of the economy-wide
containment policy. Workers cannot change their sector. Nevertheless, it is assumed
that workers of different sectors have contact with each other at work. That is why
placing a fraction of the luxury sector under lockdown decreases the probability of
83
economic activity, like in the model of Eichenbaum et al. (2020a), can be ruled out
in this setting. This Section firstly studies the impact of age-related heterogeneity
as modelled by Acemoglu et al. (2020). Secondly, the model of Glover et al. (2020)
is discussed. Then, the findings of Kaplan et al. (2020a) are presented as a supple-
mentary view on distributional aspects. After this, different sectors as modelled by
Bodenstein et al. (2020) are considered. Lastly, the model by Krueger et al. (2020)
is contemplated.
Acemoglu et al. (2020) consider a setting in which the population is divided
into a set of different age groups where it is assumed that older age groups face
higher risks from an infection than younger ones. To this end, they extend the
epidemiological framework by assuming that older age groups are more likely to die.
All age groups supply labour to a certain degree and can be subject to a group-
specific lockdown policy. According to Acemoglu et al. (2020), it is optimal to
introduce a targeted lockdown. Specifically, the older an age group is, the stricter is
the lockdown policy directed at it, i.e. the higher is the fraction of said age group put
under a lockdown order. Under such circumstances, the more an age group benefits
from a shut-down, the more of the costs of said shut-down it bears. Thus, the
costs of the shut-down are distributed among the population groups in proportion
to their respective gains from it. Moreover, the trade-off between containing the
pandemic and upholding economic activity established by Eichenbaum et al. (2020a)
is mitigated. As described in Chapter 4, Acemoglu et al. (2020) find that a targeted
lockdown policy outperforms a uniform lockdown policy regarding both the severity
of the recession associated with it and the total number of deaths prevented by it.
The framework Glover et al. (2020) use to introduce both age- and sector-related
heterogeneity into an integrated assessment model of COVID-19 and the economy is
as follows. The population is divided into two age groups: the young and the old. As
before, the old bear a higher risk than the young. However, it is assumed that only
the young supply labour and the old do not. Hence, the young are further divided
into sub-groups based on what sector they supply their labour to. There is a basic
sector and a luxury sector. The basic sector cannot be shut down. This reflects the
fact that Glover et al. (2020) think of this sector as the one encompassing essential
goods and services, like healthcare. The government can reduce economic activity in
the luxury sector by asking a fraction of workers in this sector to stay at home and not
work. The extent of this fraction directly reflects the strength of the economy-wide
containment policy. Workers cannot change their sector. Nevertheless, it is assumed
that workers of different sectors have contact with each other at work. That is why
placing a fraction of the luxury sector under lockdown decreases the probability of
83
getting infected for all workers. In the model, economic output increases linearly
with the number of people working. The output goods of the two sectors are identical
and perfectly substitutable.
It is apparent that the trade-off between containing the pandemic and upholding
economic activity established by Eichenbaum et al. (2020a) continues to exist in the
model of Glover et al. (2020). However, its nature is altered by the introduction of
age groups and sectors. The costs of the lockdown are not distributed among the
different population groups in proportion to their respective gains from it. Instead,
the distribution has an intergenerational feature. Since the old are more likely than
the young to experience severe courses of COVID-19, they benefit more from con-
tainment measures than the young. Moreover, Glover et al. (2020) assume that the
old receive their income from the government, whereas the young normally need to
provide for it by supplying labour. Consequently, the costs of a containment policy
marked by shutting down economic activity, and thus reducing labour demand, are
mainly imposed on the young. Specifically, the bearers of the costs of a shut-down
are those workers of the luxury sector who have been asked to stay at home by the
government. They are not able to supply work and thus, they lose income. The
stronger the containment policy is, the more employees of the luxury sector are
affected by this. Consequently, this group of the population prefers weaker contain-
ment measures while the old prefer stronger ones and basic workers are, in the scope
of the model, virtually indifferent about this question. Under these circumstances,
implementing any containment policy generates different welfare effects for different
age groups.
Therefore, extended lockdowns could create the need for potentially large redis-
tributive policies. In the framework of Glover et al. (2020), redistribution means
that the government has to transfer income from the working population to people
who cannot work anymore because they got infected, are retired, or their working
sector got shut down and they cannot easily reallocate across sectors.
According to their findings, the costs of redistribution depend on the level of the
mitigation strategy. The more aggressive the lockdown is, the smaller the pool of
workers is. Therefore, it becomes harder to transfer income from workers to non-
workers in order to rule out consumption inequalities. A very aggressive containment
policy will lead to a large pool of people who cannot perform their jobs anymore.
These people will lose their income and depend on transfers of income in order to
be able to satisfy their consumption needs. Because of that, more income has to
be transferred from the working population to non-workers. One example of such a
transfer is the short-time work compensation discussed in Chapter 5. The small pool
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of people who still can attend their jobs will face high taxes on income to finance the
expanded redistribution needs. This will lead to a forced cutback on consumption.
As a result, perfect insurance for loss of income is not an optimal strategy in the
model. To counteract this, the government will choose a much more moderate
mitigation policy in order to prevent redistribution costs that are too high. In fact,
Glover et al. (2020) find that the government will choose more moderate mitigation
policies when redistribution costs are rising. They argue that, when redistribution is
costless, the government can choose a more aggressive containment policy. It should
also be noted that, according to the results of the analysis, the optimal mitigation
policy under the assumption of costless redistribution is even much more moderate
than the mitigation policies we can observe in reality.
It is important to point out that the conflict of generations Glover et al. (2020)
establish only arises in their model due to especially restrictive assumptions, which
are unlikely to hold in reality. It is doubtful whether workers in the luxury sector are
the only population group that can be targeted by a lockdown. Even if all workers
of the basic sector were indispensable, there would be no reason why the old cannot
be subject to a social distancing order of some sort. While they are not affected
by measures targeting the supply side in the scope of the model of Glover et al.
(2020), their behaviour could be altered by measures targeting the demand side, i.e.
decreasing their consumption. Such measures are not included in the model, nor
are social distancing measures decreasing infections that are not related to work or
consumption. However, they could significantly dilute the findings of Glover et al.
(2020). That is why those findings should be seen as a supplementary view to the
models presented here.
Kaplan et al. (2020a) consider a more comprehensive framework, taking into
account different kinds of labour as well as heterogeneity regarding households’
liquid wealth. In their research, they combine a HANK (heterogenous agents new
Keynesian) model with a basic epidemiological model to study the macroeconomic
and distributional effects of the pandemic. The economic framework used in the
paper consists of households which can be either liquid or illiquid. These households
can consume three goods (regular, social, or home production) and can supply three
types of labour (workplace, remote, or home production). In this framework, the
labour force can be occupied in jobs that have differing levels of flexibility, i.e. the
potentiality of performing work from home, and social interactions.
Kaplan et al. (2020a) find that, in a ”do nothing” scenario, i.e. when the gov-
ernment imposes no lockdown measures, the pandemic mainly affects workers in
occupations with low job flexibility, i.e. jobs that cannot be easily done from home,
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in terms of loss in gross labour income. Moreover, they find that workers employed
in occupations that cannot easily be substituted for telework also have the lowest
liquid wealth on average. These kinds of jobs are the ones that are most likely
subject to lockdowns. Therefore, households with low levels of liquidity are affected
the most by the lockdowns when financial help is not available. Furthermore, Ka-
plan et al. (2020a) state that workers in occupations with high intensity in social
interactions face more substantial adverse effects than workers in occupations with
a less intense social component due to the sharp decline in social consumption.
Hereinafter, the model of Bodenstein et al. (2020) will be considered. To intro-
duce heterogeneity caused by different sectors, they divide the economy into two
sectors – the core sector and the non-core sector – similar to the approach of Glover
et al. (2020). Both sectors produce intermediate goods. However, the core sector
only uses labour while the non-core sector uses both labour and capital. Addition-
ally, a minimum scale requirement is imposed on the core sector, i.e. the highest
amount of input yielding no output is greater than zero. Finally, the non-core sec-
tor uses both intermediate goods as input to produce a final output good. In this
process, the substitutability between the intermediate goods is very limited.
From a sector-related perspective, the population is divided into three groups:
workers in the core sector, workers in the non-core sector, and individuals who are
not part of the labour force. It is assumed that individuals cannot change the sector
they are employed in. A fraction of the workforce of each sector has the ability to
work from home.
For the epidemiological side of their model, Bodenstein et al. (2020) build on
the SIR framework described in Section 6.2. Unlike in Glover et al. (2020), there
are no differences in the recovery rates across the population groups. Containment
measures are modelled as social distancing orders which target a specific sector-
related group, quarantining a fraction of its members at home regardless of their
health state. That way, there are less interactions between individuals within and
across groups, leading to less infections.
In the model of Bodenstein et al. (2020), introducing sector-related heterogeneity
relativises the trade-off between containing the pandemic and upholding economic
activity established by Eichenbaum et al. (2020a). Eichenbaum et al. (2020a) find
that not implementing containment measures leads to a milder recession than imple-
menting containment measures at the cost of a more severe course of the pandemic.
Bodenstein et al. (2020) find the contrary: not implementing containment measures
can lead to a larger recession than implementing them. The reason for this is that
an uncontained pandemic running its course infects a higher number of people than
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a contained one. Therefore, less labour is supplied to the sectors of the economy
as more and more workers get infected and develop symptoms. While the non-core
sector can compensate a part of its shortfall in labour input by increasing capital
input, the core sector, which relies on labour as its sole input factor, cannot do that.
Because of the low substitutability between the intermediate goods provided by the
two sectors, the production of the final output good decreases. To summarise, when
too many workers of the core sector are unable to provide labour due to being sick,
supply chain disruptions arise and seriously hurt the economy. Social distancing
can prevent such a scenario. When it chiefly targets the non-core sector, it reduces
infections in both sectors through the mechanism described before, while not remov-
ing even more labour input from the especially vulnerable core sector than what is
already removed by the pandemic. The fact that a fraction of the workforce of each
sector is able to work from home further mitigates the shortfall in labour input
resulting from social distancing. In the calibrated version of their model, Boden-
stein et al. (2020) consider, among other things, a social distancing order where the
fraction of workers of each sector who are asked to stay home by the government is
equal to the fraction of workers in the respective sector who are able to work from
home, i.e. there are no shortfalls in labour supply that can be traced back to social
distancing. They show that, under such circumstances, the recession would be much
milder than in a scenario with no social distancing order. In conclusion, there is
no hard trade-off between containing the pandemic and upholding economic activ-
ity anymore. Instead, containment measures can be helpful in upholding economic
activity, when sector-related heterogeneity and the supply chain of the economy is
considered. As described in Chapter 4, such an outcome has been observed during
the Spanish flu.
Krueger et al. (2020) use an integrated-assessment model for their analysis, where
they combine a macroeconomic model with the epidemiological SIR framework. This
model is similar to the basic model by Eichenbaum et al. (2020a). For their analysis,
Krueger et al. (2020) introduce a continuum of different sectors to the model. Here,
workers can reallocate across sectors or supply their work to several sectors at the
same time. For the epidemiological side of the model, they build upon the standard
SIR framework. They assume that the infection risk is independent of the choice of
the sector and only depends on the type of consumption or working activity. Several
goods can equally be consumed at home without the need for a social setting. In the
paper, the consumption of a pizza is presented as an example for substitutability
of consumption types. The pizza can get delivered to one’s home, where it can be
consumed in privacy. This substitution of consumption will lead to a lower infection
87
risk than a visit to the restaurant. The same applies to work that can be done in
the same way at home as in an office. Krueger et al. (2020) assume that susceptible
people will prefer consumption from sectors with a low risk of getting infected while
already infected people do not care about the infection risks in the different sectors.
In their analysis, Krueger et al. (2020) find that the majority of the decline in
economic activity can be avoided in the model with heterogeneous sectors compared
to the basic model by Eichenbaum et al. (2020a), even without the need of govern-
mental interventions. Moreover, they observe that, by considering the endogenous
change in habits like social distancing and the compliance to hygiene guidelines,
adverse health outcomes of the pandemic can be ruled out entirely without the
imposition of lockdowns by the authorities. Krueger et al. (2020) compare these
findings to the way Sweden deals with the pandemic. They claim that the health
outcomes for the Swedish population do not significantly differ from other European
countries, but Sweden does not face such a drastic decline in economic activity. Two
critical assumptions are required for the trouble-free functioning of their model: a
frictionless labour market and high substitutability of consumption across sectors.
Both will likely be violated in reality. Labour market frictions will persist because
of the need for specialisation of workers, and a high substitutability of consumption
will not hold for every sector; healthcare, for example, cannot be provided remotely
on a large scale (see the motivation behind the paper of Bodenstein et al. (2020)).
However, the findings of Krueger et al. (2020) could serve as an indication that
the re-opening of the economic markets may have beneficial effects on economic ac-
tivity without the threat of suffering from significant adverse effects on the health
outcomes of the pandemic.
6.4 Further Avenues for Research
While we have read the underlying literature carefully, some additional possible
extensions came to our minds, which have not yet been covered in the literature.
These possible extensions should be seen as a kind of food for thought, which could
well be considered in future research.
Firstly, in the paper by Eichenbaum et al. (2020b), the beneficial effects of tests
and targeted quarantines on the economy and health outcomes of the pandemic
were analysed. We saw that testing, together with targeted quarantining, can have
tremendous positive impacts on the course of the pandemic. However, in their model,
Eichenbaum et al. (2020b) abstract from modelling the costs that are associated
with extensive testing procedures. The same abstraction is undertaken regarding
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vaccines and treatments in the Eichenbaum et al. (2020a) model. Also considering
the costs of testing, for example, could play a significant role in the identification
of the optimal parameter for the fraction of people that get tested each period.
The costs and benefits of massive testing during pandemics based on historical data
might be an insightful extension to the work done in Chapter 4 for the future.
These findings could serve as a basis for further theoretical analytics. Furthermore,
carrying out dozens of tests each day may simply be not possible due to limitations
in the production and distribution of tests and limited capacities of laboratories for
test evaluations. The determination of laboratory capacity could serve as a natural
upper limit for the intensity of testing.
Secondly, human capital could get affected by the disease. On the one hand,
some patients report persistent lung damage after the recovery from the disease.
According to the news, these persons could suffer from shortness of breath when
engaging in physically demanding activities. If these people are employed in oc-
cupations that require high amounts of physically demanding work, the long-term
COVID-19 side effects could lead to lower labour productivity. This, in turn, could
affect the economic growth of the sectors involved. On the other hand, educational
institutions have been shut down for several months now. Students were not able
to attend the schools and had to be home-schooled. In this context, the question
arises whether this home-schooling by parents can serve as an adequate alternative
for teaching in class. If not, a lower level of education could be the result for some
students. Therefore, it could be interesting to analyse whether this can serve as a
factor which has detrimental effects on the accumulation of human capital.
Thirdly, Kaplan et al. (2020a) point out that households with the lowest levels
of liquidity, which are also employed in relatively rigid occupations, are affected
the most by the pandemic and mitigation policies. In this setting, it could be
interesting to link these findings to parameters which monitor the effectiveness of
certain containment measures. It appears obvious that households with such low
levels of available income face the strongest need to still go to work, even during
the peak of the infection activities. They may simply not be able to survive for
long without the help of financial transfers of income. Hence, one could argue that
these households are likely to not follow governmental restrictions, and therefore,
effectiveness of lockdowns could get adversely affected when lockdowns mainly affect
these poor households while they do not get assistance.
Finally, it could be analysed whether government-funded non-quarantine pro-
tective measures could be appropriate alternatives for extended and far-reaching
containment measures like lockdowns. A possible protective measure could be the
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governmental investment in programs to educate the population on the implications
of the pandemic and encourage people to follow important hygiene guidelines care-
fully and dutifully. Furthermore, the government could invest in the free distribution
of hygiene articles like masks, protective gloves or hand sanitiser. Maybe this would
lead to better compliance of the population with orders like the compulsory use of
face masks, which, in turn, could have beneficial effects on the economic activity
without the need for aggressive containment policies.
6.5 Conclusion
This Chapter highlights the link between economic activity and the course of the
pandemic. The trade-off between containing the pandemic and upholding economic
activity is the point of reference for each model that is presented. Testing and tar-
geted quarantine allow for a policy of smart containment, which can simultaneously
reduce the severity of the recession associated with introducing containment mea-
sures and improve health outcomes. Introducing age-related heterogeneity where all
age groups are assumed to supply labour to a certain degree and all age groups can
be put under a lockdown implies an optimal policy which distributes the costs of a
shut-down among the age groups in proportion to the respective benefits they gain
from it. In a different setting with both different age groups and sectors, the old ben-
efit the most from containment, whereas young people working in the non-essential
sector mainly bear the costs of a shutdown. Redistribution measures can mitigate
this conflict. However, they cause redistribution costs that impact optimal policy.
With an alternative set of assumptions, hurtful supply chain disruptions can arise.
They can be prevented by a shut-down of parts of a non-essential sector, implying
that such a partial shut-down is beneficial. Finally, given a high substitutability of
consumption and work in a framework of heterogeneous sectors, the adverse effects
of the pandemic can be sufficiently mitigated though endogenous behaviour without
the need for lockdowns.
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Valentina Chikina and Philipp Jonathan Jaschke
After sluggish global real GDP growth of 2.9% in 2019, the economic forecasts looked
promising for 2020. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicted a growth
in global real GDP of 3.4% for 2020. But the outbreak of COVID-19 in late 2019
and its fast spread in early 2020 posed a threat to economies all around the world.
In the first months of its existence, the novel Coronavirus has become one of the
most influential factors in the economic sphere of each state. In April 2020, the IMF
revised its forecast and corrected it down to a decline in real GDP of 4.9% for 2020.
The massive drop in GDP reflects the biggest decline for the world economy since
the great recession in 2008.
According to the IMF World Economic Outlook, as summarised in Table 7.3,
most of the important economic markets have to deal with a massive reduction in
GDP for 2020. For Germany, the IMF predicts real GDP to fall by 7.8%. The GDP
of the whole Euro area will even decrease by 10.2% according to the IMF. Similarly,
the United States will face a predicted drop in real GDP of eight percent. Among
the world’s most important economies, the IMF predicts positive growth in 2020
only for China.
Pandemics like COVID-19 are rare events that can affect the whole economy, as
demonstrated by the IMF’s corrected predictions of economic growth. A nationwide
shutdown like the one declared by many countries worldwide is an attempt of historic
proportions to control the spread of the novel Coronavirus Therefore, in a daily
changing situation, all forecasters mention the high uncertainty in their forecasts
and all the data presented in this Chapter should equally be read as a best guess at
the time of writing. All of this leaves us with two main questions: How deep is the
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and all the data presented in this Chapter should equally be read as a best guess at
the time of writing. All of this leaves us with two main questions: How deep is the
recession? And how long will it take the economy to recover?
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To answer these questions, we take a look at forecasts for the global economy
and, in more detail, for Germany. In this Chapter, we focus on the main eco-
nomic transmission channels that have an influence on the GDP: The sudden global
spread of the Coronavirus leads to shocks on aggregate demand and aggregate sup-
ply. Firms reduce their supply due to restrictions on production processes and a
decline in demand, especially in the tourism and catering sector. Furthermore, un-
employment, lower wages due to a lower output as well as short-time work lead to
lower household income. Because of the high level of uncertainty about future de-
velopment, households try to smooth their consumption over time. Due to the fact
that firms also face the high uncertainty about future development, they respond
by lowering their demand on investments. The decline in demand of households and
firms then negatively affects stock prices. Resulting disruptions in supply-chains
have negative effects on international trade. Due to cutdowns in production quan-
tities, the demand for commodity goods decreases. This leads to differential effects
on commodity importers and commodity exporters. Since oil supply is less elastic
than oil demand, the shift in commodity goods demand affects global oil prices.
In the sphere of monetary policy, central banks lower the interest rates in order to
stimulate demand for goods and investments. However, because the interest rates
are already relatively low, the central bank’s abilities to stimulate economic growth
are limited. On the other side, governments have to participate in an active fiscal
policy to stabilise demand and supply, as previously discussed in Chapter 5. The
resulting increase in government spending leads to long-run consequences for gov-
ernment debt. Finally, due to supply-chain disruptions and the collapse of global
tourism activity, the economic shock even gets transmitted to countries that do not
have any COVID-19 cases yet.
The following Sections argue along the described structure of economic trans-
mission channels, condensing the theoretical and empirical findings that have been
contemplated in this work.
7.1 Global Economy
In the previous Chapters, we have already seen that the recession caused by the
Coronavirus pandemic affects the global economy heavily this year. The IMF fore-
cast of June 2020 expects the global economy to decrease by 4.9% in 2020, followed
by a significant recovery of 5.4% in 2021. Experts adjusted their forecasts accord-
ingly during the past couple of months, assuming, however, that it will be possible
to take control of the pandemic to a large extent and that economic activity recovers
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already during the second half of 2020.
The simultaneous aggregate supply and demand shocks described in previous
Chapters are transmitted through various economic channels to different economic
aggregates. In the following, we will take a closer look at these economic channels
and forecasts for the most important aggregates.
As a reaction to both the pandemic and counteractive medical and political mea-
sures, firms all over the world were forced to reduce supply. In some sectors, produc-
tion was completely shut down due to production restrictions seeking to reduce the
risk of infection and stop infection chains. Many US experts and businessmen claim
that a lot of companies report failures in their work and lose stability accordingly
(Baker et al., 2020). The supply of goods is now marked by irregularities, which
has a strong impact on the emotional state of people, resulting in panic buying.
The lead time in many stores doubled. There is a shortage of raw materials and
resources. Governments are trying to solve these and other problems by introducing
various measures to help citizens, which are discussed in Chapter 5 of this work.
The shutdown measures also provoked reduced demand, e.g. in gastronomy and in
tourism.
Local aggregate supply shocks result in a lower output of products and services.
This problem is aggravated by negative demand shocks for some goods, as con-
sumers may cut back consumption for fear of getting infected. Wages decrease,
while unemployment and bankruptcies increase. Consumer spending is expected to
decrease in 2020 according to the Consensus Forecast (CF), and countries like Italy
and Spain are more severely affected than e.g. Germany and the United States. In
2021, confidence is expected to rise again which results in an increase of personal
consumption. The expected changes of personal consumption in 2020 and 2021 for
a selection of advanced economies can be found in Table 7.1.








Euro Zone -8,10% 6,46%
Source: Consensus Forecast August 2020
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The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) esti-
mates that international tourism will decline by roughly 60% in 2020. The reduction
could even be as high as 80% if the international situation does not improve until
the end of this year. This number is relevant because tourism directly contributes to
4.4% of GDP and 6.9% of employment and is thus an important driver of economic
growth. It is expected that domestic tourism will recover the fastest, international
tourism within specific geographical regions, such as the European Union will re-
cover afterwards. If NPIs, which are discussed in detail in Chapter 4, are properly
implemented and work as intended, it is assumed that the economic and social bur-
den of isolations might be relieved by summer. However, it cannot be surely known
whether the economy will recover to its level before the pandemic. This is especially
true for the tourism sector, which involves many companies around the world.
Similarly, global trade will drop by up to 32% this year due to the Coronavirus
pandemic according to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Commodity goods
are an important element of trade.
The drop in demand of commodity goods has differential effects on commodity
exporters and commodity importers. As shown in Figure 7.1, the WTO predicts
that the global commodity trade could fall by 13-32% in 2020, depending on how
long the restrictions caused by COVID-19 will exist. Because oil supply is less elastic
than oil demand, oil prices are affected heavily and drop. The volatility of the last
months is historical, the futures for oil even reached negative values on 20 April
this year. In their forecast of April, the CF reports for a mean oil price of $34 in
3 months and $42,8 in 12 months. Oil prices have stabilised since then and are
currently around $44.2. The CF estimates in their August report a mean oil price of
S42.8 in 3 months and $48 in 12 months. For the US, the average Brent breakeven
price is estimated around $46 in 2019. For the middle eastern countries like Saudi
Arabia the number is just around $42 (Energy, 2019). If prices do not exceed the
breakeven price, losses arise. Although low oil prices are said to boost the growth of
the world economy, negative effects for oil producing countries are serious, such as
Venezuela or many members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC). Therefore, falling oil prices may – depending on the country – mitigate
or increase some of the recessionary trends. The World Bank estimates that Iraq,
Libya, Republic of Kongo and Kuwait each rely up to 36-38% on oil revenue to grow
their economy. Saudi Arabia relies up to 23.1%, Iran up to 15.3% and Venezuela up
to 11.3% on oil profits. The reliance measure is defined by the oil rents. Especially
for the first group of countries, the observed drop in oil prices will likely have severe
effects on their economy. However, as the majority of countries are oil importers, a
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low oil price appears to have a positive stimulating effect on the world economy.
Figure 7.1 – World Merchandise Trade Volume (2000 – 2022)
Notes: This figure depicts the world merchandise trade volume as an index series (2015 = 100);
Source: World Trade Organization (2019)
Falling stock markets, higher stock market volatility, and larger disagreement
across different forecasters all indicate that uncertainty is rising. Since the end of
February, reports of infections in large economies such as South Korea and Italy were
published. Financial markets were beginning to internalise possible consequences of
the spread of the virus, uncertainty was growing. Thus, stock market prices fell
tremendously. US Treasury bond yields also fell to a record low, as market par-
ticipants searched for safe assets. This development puts additional pressure on
consumption, as risk-averse consumers try to smooth consumption over the foresee-
able future. Moreover, it reduces the willingness to invest on the side of companies.
Lower investments, in turn, may reduce the capital stock and thereby imply negative
long-run consequences for the recovery after the crisis.
Possible measures to counteract the recession are monetary policy or fiscal policy.
The normal monetary policy reaction of lower interest rates is restricted by the
existence of the zero lower bound. Therefore, many central banks have set up large-
scale quantitative-easing programs. Still, inflation will be below target in 2020.
The Consumer Price Index (CPI) is expected to increase slightly in the US and
more strongly in 2021. The expected changes of consumer prices for a selection of
countries and the Euro Zone can be found in Table 7.2.
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Monetary policy is flanked by expansionary fiscal policy to stabilise demand
and supply. This increases government deficits and government debt levels. The
Government debt-to-GDP ratio is increasing rapidly. For the US, Trading Economics
estimate the debt-to-GDP ratio to increase from 107% in 2019 to 125% of GDP in
2021. In the Euro Area, debt-to-GDP will most likely increase from 84% (2019) to
102% of GDP (2021).
In order to have a closer look at the forecasts on economic growth of some
selected countries, it might be helpful to differentiate between countries hit more by
supply channel effects and countries hit more by demand channel effects, especially
regarding tourism. If an economy is highly dependent on the tourism sector, the
impact on GDP will be much stronger than for others. To a certain degree, this
impact might result from imposed travel bans as presented in Chapter 4.
In the European Union, the tourism sector is said to rebound as one of the first as
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protocols, thus restoring consumer confidence. Air travel organisations currently
assume that the airline industry will be returning to pre-crisis levels at the beginning
of 2021. The hospitality industry is said to return to pre-crisis levels not before 2022,
according to the OECD. Taking all into account, it seems as if a quick recovery is
96







Euro Zone 0,40% 1,11%
Source: Consensus Forecast August 2020
Monetary policy is flanked by expansionary fiscal policy to stabilise demand
and supply. This increases government deficits and government debt levels. The
Government debt-to-GDP ratio is increasing rapidly. For the US, Trading Economics
estimate the debt-to-GDP ratio to increase from 107% in 2019 to 125% of GDP in
2021. In the Euro Area, debt-to-GDP will most likely increase from 84% (2019) to
102% of GDP (2021).
In order to have a closer look at the forecasts on economic growth of some
selected countries, it might be helpful to differentiate between countries hit more by
supply channel effects and countries hit more by demand channel effects, especially
regarding tourism. If an economy is highly dependent on the tourism sector, the
impact on GDP will be much stronger than for others. To a certain degree, this
impact might result from imposed travel bans as presented in Chapter 4.
In the European Union, the tourism sector is said to rebound as one of the first as
well as domestic tourism in general which is responsible for around 75% of tourism
in OECD countries. It is striking that the tourism sector plays an important role
especially in Spain and Portugal. Countries where tourism is an important part
of the total economy are also countries where domestic tourism (which is hit less
by travel restrictions) is less important. For example, according to OECD data,
domestic tourism accounts for 30% of total tourism in Portugal, but for 85% in
Germany. If (international) tourism is to bounce back from the current recession,
it is relying on government action to open state borders, lift travel restrictions,
provide liquidity and stimulate demand. Businesses need to follow health and safety
protocols, thus restoring consumer confidence. Air travel organisations currently
assume that the airline industry will be returning to pre-crisis levels at the beginning
of 2021. The hospitality industry is said to return to pre-crisis levels not before 2022,
according to the OECD. Taking all into account, it seems as if a quick recovery is
96
not yet conceivable for the international tourism industry.
Countries whose economy is heavily dependent on foreign trade and constant
supplies, like Germany, are also suffering economically as an outcome of the Coron-
avirus pandemic. In Germany, GDP is expected to decline by 7.8% in 2020 accord-
ing to the IMF Forecast, which is a huge decline in GDP for Germany. However,
compared to other European countries and the complete European area which are
expected experience a reduction of GDP of 10.2% in 2020, Germany fares well and
has the potential to recover quickly. The expected decline in growth of other coun-
tries and their (partial) catch-up in 2021 can be found in Table 7.3. With respect to
Europe, the projected economic downturn associated with COVID-19 by the Euro-
pean Commission for the EU-27 amounts to a reduction of 9.2% in export of goods
and services outside the EU and an 8.8% decrease in imports to EU-27 countries in
2020. The forecast values are adjusted constantly. When comparing the IMF fore-
cast on GDP growth from June with the CF forecast from August (see Table 7.4),
it becomes clear that the forecasts are currently improving over time. It is therefore
assumed economies are developing better than it was thought at the beginning of
the pandemic.
Since we observe a recession on a global scale, it is worth noting that we can also
predict an increase in unemployment, government debt and deficits. Unemployment
is rising across the globe. In the US, the unemployment rate was as high as 14.7% in
April according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, which is the highest since World
War II. Since then it dropped slightly down to 10.2% in July. The CF forecasts
a mean of 9.1% for the US unemployment rate in 2020 and 7.40% for 2021. The
increase in unemployment numbers depends on the conditions of the labour market
in various countries. In Germany, for example, employees are supported by short-
time work benefits (so-called ”Kurzarbeitergeld”), in order to keep employees in
their jobs and to prevent a massive outbreak of unemployment. Chapter 5 tries to
give a comparison of both unemployment benefits and short-time work benefits and
in the next Section we will deal with Kurzarbeit in more detail.
7.2 Germany
Germany is no exception to the rest of the world. Especially the producing and
exporting industry sectors are affected by the pandemic given the sharp decline in
global trade. Following the previous Section we will now turn to the GDP forecast
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Table 7.3 – IMF World Economic Outlook Growth Projections
Projections
2019 2020 2021
World output 2.9 -4.9 5.4
Advanced economies 1.7 -8.0 4.8
United States 2.3 -8.0 4.5
Euro Area 1.3 -10.2 6.0
Germany 0.6 -7.8 5.4
France 1.5 -12.5 7.3
Italy 0.3 -12.8 6.3
Spain 2.0 -12.8 6.3
Japan 0.7 -5.8 2.4
United Kingdom 1.4 -10.2 6.3
Canada 1.7 -8.4 4.9
Other advanced economies 1.7 -4.8 4.2
Emerging markets and developing countries 3.7 -3.0 5.9
Emerging and developing Asia 5.5 -0.8 7.4
China 6.1 1.0 8.2
India 4.2 -4.5 6.0
ASEAN-5 4.9 -2.0 6.2
Emerging and developing Europe 2.1 -5.8 4.3
Russia 1.3 -6.6 4.1
Latin America and the Caribbean 0.1 -9.4 3.7
Brazil 1.1 -9.1 3.6
Mexico -0.3 -10.5 3.3
Middle East and Central Asia 1.0 -4.7 3.3
Saudi Arabia 0.3 -6.8 3.1
Sub-Saharan Africa 3.1 -3.2 3.4
Nigeria 2.2 -5.4 2.6
South Africa 0.2 -8.0 3.5
Low-Income developing countries 5.2 -1.0 5.2
Notes: This Table depicts the projections of annual percent change in real GDP of selected coun-
tries; Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Update (June 2020)
on Germany and discuss the various economic channels and indicators driven by the
simultaneous supply and demand shock while also taking a closer look at bankrupt-
cies and the unemployment estimates in detail. Firstly, we will address the 2020
forecasts. We collected forecast data from four main sources: The German Coun-
cil of Economic Experts (GCEE), the Joint Economic Forecast (JEF), which made
98
Table 7.3 – IMF World Economic Outlook Growth Projections
Projections
2019 2020 2021
World output 2.9 -4.9 5.4
Advanced economies 1.7 -8.0 4.8
United States 2.3 -8.0 4.5
Euro Area 1.3 -10.2 6.0
Germany 0.6 -7.8 5.4
France 1.5 -12.5 7.3
Italy 0.3 -12.8 6.3
Spain 2.0 -12.8 6.3
Japan 0.7 -5.8 2.4
United Kingdom 1.4 -10.2 6.3
Canada 1.7 -8.4 4.9
Other advanced economies 1.7 -4.8 4.2
Emerging markets and developing countries 3.7 -3.0 5.9
Emerging and developing Asia 5.5 -0.8 7.4
China 6.1 1.0 8.2
India 4.2 -4.5 6.0
ASEAN-5 4.9 -2.0 6.2
Emerging and developing Europe 2.1 -5.8 4.3
Russia 1.3 -6.6 4.1
Latin America and the Caribbean 0.1 -9.4 3.7
Brazil 1.1 -9.1 3.6
Mexico -0.3 -10.5 3.3
Middle East and Central Asia 1.0 -4.7 3.3
Saudi Arabia 0.3 -6.8 3.1
Sub-Saharan Africa 3.1 -3.2 3.4
Nigeria 2.2 -5.4 2.6
South Africa 0.2 -8.0 3.5
Low-Income developing countries 5.2 -1.0 5.2
Notes: This Table depicts the projections of annual percent change in real GDP of selected coun-
tries; Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Update (June 2020)
on Germany and discuss the various economic channels and indicators driven by the
simultaneous supply and demand shock while also taking a closer look at bankrupt-
cies and the unemployment estimates in detail. Firstly, we will address the 2020
forecasts. We collected forecast data from four main sources: The German Coun-
cil of Economic Experts (GCEE), the Joint Economic Forecast (JEF), which made
98







Euro Zone -7,88% 5,68%
Source: Consensus Forecast August 2020
assumptions regarding the epidemiological parameters and the shutdown, and the
Ifo Institute for Economic Research (ifo) as well as the consensus forecast from the
Consensus Economics (CF), which did not mention those assumptions. We com-
pare those to the current reality and make a general interpretation on that basis
regarding the accuracy of those assumptions, as shown in Table 7.2. Lastly, we will
shortly mention the 2021 forecasts.
7.2.1 GDP Forecasts
Prior to COVID-19, German real GDP was supposed to grow (if not otherwise
stated, we refer to the real GDP just as GDP in the following) between 0.5% (GCEE
and CF) and 1.1% (JEF) in 2020. These projections were updated several times.
First, the GCEE made a special forecast to account for the COVID-19 outbreak in
their prognosis. They now propose a GDP growth of -2.8% for the baseline model
(V-recovery). In this model however, they assume that infections are contained
quickly, that the shutdown lasts five weeks followed by a three-week recovery and
that the economy is fully recovering during the summer. In the risk scenario 1
(distinctive V-recovery), the demand shock is more severe and lasts into May, with
a seven-week shutdown followed by a five-week recovery phase. In this scenario,
the GCEE forecasts a 5.4% decrease in GDP. In reality, the shutdown was lifted
non-uniformly in different economic sectors. For instance, stores with space below
800 m2 could open up again on 20 April 2020, whereas stores over the 800 m2-limit
as well as hair studios needed to wait until 6 May. Therefore, the duration of the
shutdown is sector-dependent, which puts the realistic scenario between the baseline
and the risk scenario 1.
The JEF assumes a decrease in GDP growth of around 4.2% in their report.
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This is partly due to the later date on which the JEF released their forecast. This
allowed for more recent data to be incorporated. They assume a slow reopening of
the economy as of 20 May, which was realistic. They additionally assumed that in
Q1 of 2021, 135,000 people would be simultaneously infected, which as of right now
seems too pessimistic. Figure 7.2 shows the estimates of the JEF and the GCEE.
The CF paints an even darker picture with forecasted GDP growth of -5.0% in their
April version and -6.5% in their latest June forecasts.
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Figure 7.2 – Real GDP Growth for Germany from the JEF (left) and the GCEE
(right)
Notes: left figure – left axis [chained volume amounts in billion euros]; right axis [quarter-on-
quarter change in %]; black line - volume (left axis); blue bars - current rate (right axis); grey line
- annual average (left axis);
right figure – left axis [GDP in billion euros]; right axis [changes to the previous year in %]; green
line - chained volumes 2019/2020; orange line – update; black line - annual average; light blue bars
- changes to the previous quarter (right axis); dark blue bars – update (right axis); from the first
quarter of 2020 it is a forecast;
Sources: Gemeinschaftsdiagnose et al. (2020) and Feld et al. (2020)
In the following Subsections, we will turn to the economic channels that consti-
tute these developments on the supply side and the demand side and take a closer
look at the variables for bankruptcies and unemployment.
7.2.2 Aggregate Supply
We now take a closer look at the factors which cause the firms to reduce their supply
in Germany.
Firstly, with the disruption of global supply chains, the producing sector is heav-
ily influenced, especially by the closing of borders and factories. Consequently, the
reduction in supply affects trading, which is illustrated by an estimated drop in
imports of 9.6% according to the JEF. Given the strong dependence of the German
economy on foreign trade, these sudden disruptions aggravate the recession even
more, even if Germany fares arguably well in terms of infection numbers.
Secondly, due to the restrictions implemented by the government to reduce viral
spreading, companies close their stores and offices, or send employees into home
office, which (on average) reduces their productivity (there are multiple reasons
for this, e.g. lower motivation, distraction by children, poorer equipment, or less
oversight). These factors lead to a lower output and supply of their goods and
services. Other businesses, like the tourism sector, had to stop offering their services
altogether because of travel bans for most European countries and even domestic
tourism – as discussed in Chapter 4 – as well as a drop in demand. Just like the
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tourism sector, the gastronomy sector experienced a sharp drop in demand as well
leading to a reduction in supply.
Thirdly, liquidity shortage is a big problem when it comes to supply. Even with
the high number of guarantees and credits backed by the Kreditanstalt für Wieder-
aufbau (KfW), a lot of companies face a difficult time due to sluggish revenue and
a lack of cashflow, which increases the risk of bankruptcies substantially. Current
numbers suggest a steady rate of bankruptcies as the Halle Institute for Economic
Research (IWH) reported in its IWH-bankruptcy trend in early May: bankruptcies
were constant at 1936 cases for March and April 2020. This may be due to the KfW
credit lines and government guarantees, which help struggling businesses to stay in
business during times with constant expenses but low revenue. However, in its June
bankruptcy trend, the IWH states 1019 bankruptcies for May, which is an increase
of 70 bankruptcies compared to April. In addition, the five biggest bankruptcies in
May account for over 10,000 lost jobs, which is a significant increase compared to the
last report. It can be assumed that the government cannot extend this kind of sup-
port for a longer time period, which would result in a rising number of bankruptcies
in autumn and winter 2020 as well as 2021, due to a lack of demand, low revenues
and high debt burdens. To make things worse, this would create feedback loops that
can reduce supply even more.
7.2.3 Aggegrate Demand
With decreasing outputs, closing of stores, and a slump in trade, the likelihood
of wage cuts or even unemployment increases. This negatively impacts consumer
spending, because of the uncertainty about future incomes. People will anticipate
the challenging economic future leading to consumption smoothing, cutting back on
spending or delaying non-essential purchases. The GCEE predicts a 3.3% decreased
consumer spending in 2020 for Germany. The CF paints an even gloomier picture
in their June forecast with a consensus of -7.0%12. Even the fear of losing their job
puts a burden on the willingness of consumers to spend money resulting in fewer
purchases of durable goods. This also has the potential for feedback loops, because
a decrease in spending leads to less revenue for the employing companies, there-
fore reducing labour, increasing unemployment, decreasing consumer confidence,
decreasing consumer spending further and so on.
However, uncertainty not only affects the willingness of consumers to spend
money, it also decreases the intention of companies to invest in their capital stock.
When uncertainty is high, companies cannot plan their revenue and earnings and
12 Such large fluctuations in consumption are extremely rare due to consumption smoothing.
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thus tend to save more money. This reduction in investment will decrease produc-
tivity in the long run. As shown by Barro et al. (2020), oil price volatility increases
short-run uncertainty and therefore, reduces investment. In addition, Baker et al.
(2020) consider uncertainty an important reason for the GDP contraction due to the
COVID-19 pandemic. They predicted a real US GDP contraction of nine percent
for the second quarter of 2020 and a peak eleven percent GDP drop for the fourth
quarter of 2020. Baker et al. (2020) estimate that more than half of this decline is
due to the uncertainty shock from COVID-19 and the connected drop in consump-
tion spending. This might apply also for the German economy. More insight on this
is given in Chapter 2.
Uncertainty also affects the stock market. The most important German stock
index, the DAX, dropped by nearly 40% from 19 February to 18 March, as depicted
by Figure 7.3. This drop was followed by a rising market. On 5 July, it was just
9.14% lower than on 19 February. On the one hand, the rising market may be caused
by monetary policy interventions of the ECB, which tend to inflate the prices of
assets, rather than improve economic outlook. On the other hand, the stock market
anticipates future economic trends, and they may by now be more optimistic about
the German recovery than they were in March.
Figure 7.3 – World Merchandise Trade Volume (2000 – 2022)
Notes: This figure depicts the index rates of the DAX performance index during the last six months
(as of 5 July 2020). The highest, lowest and current values are labeled in the figure together with
the percent change relative to the maximum;
Source: Based on data retrieved on 5 July 2020 from Yahoo Finance (finance.yahoo.com).
Another reason for the decrease in the demand of consumption goods stems from
social distancing measures all around the world. The internalisation of the infection
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risks (see Chapters 4 and 6) leads to a drop in consumption as well. This especially
affects physical retailers as people gradually started to purchase their goods online
to avoid infections.
Lastly Germany is one of the world’s biggest export nations. This big export-
oriented sector is an issue in times of low global demand like now. Closed borders
around the world, disruption of supply chains and rising tensions in trade with the
US are also a problem to the exporting nation of Germany. Therefore, the JEF
estimates an export decline of 10.9% for 2020 (see Figure 7.4).
Figure 7.4 – Real Imports (left) and Real Exports (right) for Germany
Notes: left axis [chained volume amounts in billion euros]; right axis [quarter-on-quarter change in
%]; black line - volume (left axis); blue bars - current rate (right axis); grey line - annual average
(left axis); Source: Gemeinschaftsdiagnose et al. (2020)
The duration of the recession is affected by existing frictions in the economy.
Loosely speaking, the larger the existing frictions, the longer the recession will take.
Thus, it depends on the capability of capital (bankruptcies) and labour (unemploy-
ment) to adjust to new developments, as well as the impact of uncertainty and rising
government debt.
7.2.4 Bankruptcies
Insolvencies are common events even in steadily growing economies. If they do
happen, capital and labour are reallocated within the economy to new firms that may
fill the gap. This process is naturally not perfect, but it is part of a healthy economy.
However, in a situation like the current one caused by the Coronavirus pandemic,
many bankruptcies can occur at the same time due to liquidity problems. This
results in a drop out of healthy companies that would normally prosper. Especially
for start-ups this is a huge problem, because they often do not have a large enough
liquidity reserve. The efficiency of capital reallocation may be even lower due to the
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fact that the involved agents (like lawyers, courts etc.) are in general not able to
handle bankruptcies perfectly, and that any inefficiency of the bankruptcy process
is likely to be aggravated if case numbers rise and decisions are taken in a rush. As
discussed earlier, right now we do not observe a spiking number of bankruptcies,
but that may change over time.
7.2.5 Unemployment and Short-Time Working
We mentioned in Subsection 7.2.3 about demand shocks, that unemployed people
are less likely to spend money, because they postpone purchases of durable goods.
Additionally, the possibility of unemployment influences the spending behaviour of
consumers enormously by reducing consumer confidence. In Germany, unemploy-
ment is not going to rise as much as in the US.. Before the pandemic, the average
forecast for unemployment in Germany was 5.0% – 5.1%. Now the forecasts range
from 5.3% – 6.07% for Germany in 2020. The reason for this is that Germany has
a system in place called short-time working (“Kurzarbeit”), which aims to prevent
mass unemployment as currently happening in the United States shown by Figure
5.4. This allows companies to reduce working times of their employees and therefore
reducing their wages but prevent layoffs. This measure helps the employees to re-
turn quickly to their jobs after the ending of the initial shock. Furthermore, it aims
to avoid massive demand drops that could result in feedback loops. It is reported
that companies applied for short-time working for 10.14 million employees, as shown
in Figure 7.5. However, this is a rather expensive measure, and companies rely on
government support to pay their employees. As a result, the longer the shutdown,
the higher the chance that these compensations become too expensive, companies
are not able to hold their employees in short-time work anymore, and therefore lay
them off.
In addition, structural change in the employment landscape would severely im-
pact the people in short-time working, as mentioned in Chapter 5. If the economic
space is not restored to pre-crash levels and structure, then former employees are
faced with unemployment anyway. The US approach of unemployment benefits is
efficient and flexible when employees cannot return to their old jobs, especially, if
many small businesses are going bankrupt or a shift from in-person interaction to
digital interaction happens. We would like to note that the US have a less regu-
lated labour market in contrast of the highly protected labour markets of European
countries. Thus, it is easier in the US to fire and hire again than in Germany, for
instance.
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to avoid massive demand drops that could result in feedback loops. It is reported
that companies applied for short-time working for 10.14 million employees, as shown
in Figure 7.5. However, this is a rather expensive measure, and companies rely on
government support to pay their employees. As a result, the longer the shutdown,
the higher the chance that these compensations become too expensive, companies
are not able to hold their employees in short-time work anymore, and therefore lay
them off.
In addition, structural change in the employment landscape would severely im-
pact the people in short-time working, as mentioned in Chapter 5. If the economic
space is not restored to pre-crash levels and structure, then former employees are
faced with unemployment anyway. The US approach of unemployment benefits is
efficient and flexible when employees cannot return to their old jobs, especially, if
many small businesses are going bankrupt or a shift from in-person interaction to
digital interaction happens. We would like to note that the US have a less regu-
lated labour market in contrast of the highly protected labour markets of European
countries. Thus, it is easier in the US to fire and hire again than in Germany, for
instance.
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Figure 7.5 – World Merchandise Trade Volume (2000 – 2022)
Notes: Short-time workers for the last four months preliminary extrapolated figures with a two-
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2020 are available until 26 April 2020; Source: Statistik der Bundesagentur für Arbeit (2020)
7.2.6 Government Debt
Ultimately, rising government debt levels are another driver of uncertainty. Due
to the large number of fiscal policy measures, which are extensively discussed in
Chapter 5, the government debt is rising significantly in contrast to the last years.
In 2019, the debt-to-GDP ratio was 59,2% (Bundesfinazministerium, 2020a). The
JEF forecasted a debt-to-GDP ratio of up to 70% at the end of 2020. The Deutsche
Bank Research estimated a ratio of even 75% and, in case of a more severe recession,
a debt-to-GDP ratio of 86.5%. The JEF points out that a lack of support for smaller
and medium sized businesses exists, which needs to be improved upon. The GCEE
introduces the idea of a consumer stimulus, which could help with weak consumer
demand. This depends on the development of the reopening of the economy and
consumer spending, but both would lead to even more government debt.
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7.2.7 Forecasts for 2021
The 2021 forecasts show that the recession is likely steep but short in nature. For the
GDP, the GCEE estimates a rise of 3.7%; the JEF and the CF are more optimistic for
2021 due to the later release date, and they respectively forecast a plus of 5.8% and
5.2%. This is mostly caused by catch-up effects. The steeper the initial drop in GDP
growth, the higher is the GDP growth after the crisis usually. The unemployment
rate is supposed to decrease slightly in 2021. The forecasted range reaches from
5.2% by the GCEE to 5.3% by the JEF and up to 5.9% by the CF in June. This is
largely dependent on the economic outfall after the reopening of the economy. If, for
instance, restaurants are in low demand, they are presumably cutting jobs, which
results in higher unemployment rates. These higher unemployment rates extend the
recovery time. Interest rates, as discussed earlier, are probably staying at 0%. The
CPI is projected to increase more than in 2020, but estimates reach from 1.4% by
the CF in June to 1.7% by the GCEE and the JEF in between with 1.5% inflation.
Depending on the current development, more fiscal policy measures could be
needed, if the current ones are not fully able to offset the repercussions of the pan-
demic. In addition, some struggling economic sectors, like the producing industry
that was in a recession even before COVID-19 occurred, could need additional aid.
All of this would increase government debt levels, even more so if tax revenue is
decreasing due to tax cuts and uncertainty with the decrease in consumer spend-
ing caused by it. Even if the German government returns to their pre-pandemic
rule to decrease their debt, it can be expected that it will take years to fulfil the
Maastricht-criteria again. Analogously, trade is predicted to bounce back in 2021,
with an estimated increase in exports of 10.1% q/q, and in imports of 10.6% q/q.
However, this largely depends on the foreign demand and therefore on the health of
the world economy. If for example, the US is hit by a second infection wave or the
economy is hit by a recession, this could result in a huge decline of exports which in
turn would put Germany at the brink of another recession. Bankruptcies could stay
steady if the future development does not deviate from the present path. Should
demand be weak throughout 2020 and possibly even in 2021, bankruptcies could
increase at the end of 2020 and more so in 2021.
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7.2.8 Reproduction Rate
Lastly, regarding the reproduction rate, one should believe that it would be the best
if reproduction rate (Rt) was as small as possible. A research paper published by
the ifo Institute in cooperation with the Helmholtz Centre for Infection Research
(HZIR) suggests something else: the optimal Rt is 0.75.
In their work, the HZIR simulated different scenarios regarding different shut-
down measures, as discussed in Chapter 4, to see the effects on the total economic
costs, the death toll and isocost lines. The findings suggest that the death toll rises
disproportionately if Rt rises above 0.9. Figure 7.6 shows the total costs for 2020
and 2021 in percent of the GDP. An Rt = 0.75 would have the smallest total costs
for the economy of around 4.6% of the GDP in 2020 and 2021. In comparison, an
Rt = 0.1 would cost 9.2% of the GDP, and an Rt = 1 would cost 7.7%. Compared
with their baseline scenario, Rt = 0.627, the economy could take nine days longer
for the recovery if Rt = 0.75 with the same result in costs. The economy would need
to increase its performance by at least 1.3% compared with the baseline so that the
relaxation of shutdown measures would be beneficial. In conclusion, their findings
suggest a slight gradual easing of shutdown measures would be the most suitable
for the economy. It shows that health costs and economic costs are not in conflict
to each other and the optimal way is a slow and thoughtful opening of the economy
and public life.
Figure 7.6 – Total Costs for 2020 and 2021 in percent of BIP
Notes: left axis [% of GDP without coronaa]; bottom axis [Reproduction number Rt]; bars –
baseline; line - Range of robustness tests; a: Counterfactual GDP of the years 2020 and 2021 of a
situation without corona crisis (steady increase, starting from Q4 2019 with the potential rate of
1.2% each over the previous year); Source: Dorn et al. (2020)
The JEF for example calculated their estimates with an Rt = 1.1. Figure 7.7
shows the point estimation and the 7-day average of the Rt. On 6 June, the point
estimator was Rt = 1.1, whereas the 7-day average was 0.9. While in recent days
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Rt exceeded 1.1, Figure 7.7 shows that for the last few months the assumption of
the JEF is correct. However, less restrictive social distancing rules and more time
spent indoors in autumn and winter may well result in higher infection rates than
we currently see, or even a second wave.
Figure 7.7 – Reproduction rate Rt as point estimation (black) and 7-day average
(red)
Notes: The horizontal dashed line represents a reproduction rate of 1.1; Source: Based on Now-
casting estimations of reproduction rate by Robert Koch Institut (2020b)
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This work has shown the trade-off between saving lives and livelihoods policymakers
faced in the first half of 2020. It tried to show the cost-benefit analysis of different
social distancing measures, analyse accompanying fiscal policy and bind all measures
together in theoretical and empirical forecasts regarding the immediate future. Yet,
we do not know if and when a possible vaccine for COVID-19 will be available, and
until when we will have to tread the fine balance between saving as many lives as
possible while keeping our standard of living. At the time of writing, the world is
potentially entering a second wave of infections. It is therefore highly likely, that the
coming developments will force politicians again to make hard choices to impose non-
pharmaceutical interventions. We may see the need for additional fiscal stimulus.
Beyond the short-run developments, the deep recession may reinforce existing trends
and lead to large shifts in the structure of our economy. For example, we could see
a permanent shift away from traditional office and away from clear division of child-
care. It is highly possible that some industries may never fully recover from the
recession, while new business models take over. These long-run consequences are
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together in theoretical and empirical forecasts regarding the immediate future. Yet,
we do not know if and when a possible vaccine for COVID-19 will be available, and
until when we will have to tread the fine balance between saving as many lives as
possible while keeping our standard of living. At the time of writing, the world is
potentially entering a second wave of infections. It is therefore highly likely, that the
coming developments will force politicians again to make hard choices to impose non-
pharmaceutical interventions. We may see the need for additional fiscal stimulus.
Beyond the short-run developments, the deep recession may reinforce existing trends
and lead to large shifts in the structure of our economy. For example, we could see
a permanent shift away from traditional office and away from clear division of child-
care. It is highly possible that some industries may never fully recover from the
recession, while new business models take over. These long-run consequences are
far beyond the scope of this work, but will be very interesting in the future.
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number of COVID-19 is higher compared to SARS coronavirus. Journal of Travel
Medicine, 27(2).
Lorenzoni, G. (2009). A Theory of Demand Shocks. American Economic Review,
99(5):2050–2084.
Ma, C., Rogers, J., and Zhou, S. (2020). Global Economic and Financial Effects
of 21st Century Pandemics and Epidemics. SSRN Electronic Journal. https:
//ssrn.com/abstract=3565646.
Markel, H., Stern, A., and Cetron, M. (2007). Nonpharmaceutical Interventions
Implemented by US Cities During the 1918-1919 Influenza Pandemic. JAMA,
298(6):644–654.
Mizumoto, K., Kagaya, K., Zarebski, A., and Chowell, G. (2020). Estimating the
asymptomatic proportion of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) cases on board
the Diamond Princess cruise ship, Yokohama, Japan, 2020. Eurosurveillance,
25(10):2000180.
Munro, J. H. (2003). The Medieval Origins of the Financial Revolution: Usury,
Rentes and Negotiability. The International History Review, 25(3):505–562.
Noy, I. and Shields, S. (2019). The 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Epi-
demic: A Retroactive Examination of Economic Costs. Asian Development Bank
Economics Working Paper Series, 591.
OECD (2020). Economic Outlook - The World Economy on a Tightrope (June
2020). https://www.oecd.org/economic-outlook, retrieved 7 July 2020.
Onder, G., Rezza, G., and Brusaferro, S. (2020). Case-Fatality Rate and Character-
istics of Patients Dying in Relation to COVID-19 in Italy. JAMA, 323(18):1775–
1776.
Pamuk, S. (2007). The Black Death and the origins of the ’Great Divergence’ across
Europe, 1300-1600. European Review of Economic History, 11(3):289–317.
Peto, J., Alwan, N. A., Godfrey, K. M., Burgess, R. A., Hunter, D. J., Riboli,
E., Romer, P., Buchan, I., Colbourn, T., Costelloe, C., et al. (2020). Univer-
sal weekly testing as the UK COVID-19 lockdown exit strategy. The Lancet,
395(10234):1420–1421.
Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung (2020). Rettungsschirm für
Unternehmen- Wirtschaftsstabilisierungsfonds. https://www.bundesregierung.
de/breg-de/themen/coronavirus/wirtschaftsstabilisierung-1733458, re-
trieved 30 June 2020.
119
Robert Koch Institut (2020a). Kontaktpersonen-Nachverfolgung bei Infektionen
durch SARS-CoV-2. https://www.rki.de/DE/Content/InfAZ/N/Neuartiges_
Coronavirus/Kontaktperson/Management.html, retrieved 24 June 2020.




Sandford, A. (2020). Coronavirus: Half of humanity Now on Lock-




Schober, T., Rack-Hoch, A., Kern, A., von Both, U., and Hübner, J.
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